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The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
By DAVID R. MASON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The first day of January, 1962, will always be a significant date in the
development of Montana law because a new system of procedure patterned
after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became operative to govern prac-
tice before the district courts of Montana. The Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure are designed to aid the exercise of jurisdiction in cases having
substantial contacts with Montana, speed up court processes, and facilitate
the decision of cases on their merits. The rules govern all suits of a civil
nature with the exception of special statutory proceedings excluded by
Rule 81, and in addition the discovery procedures apply to proceedings in
probate.' They are applicable not only to actions commenced after their
effective date, but so far as feasible, and to the extent that they do not
work an injustice, they also govern proceedings in actions pending in Mon-
tana district courts of January 1, 1962.'
It is the purpose of this article to evaluate some of the available mate-
rials on the Federal Rules and to discuss salient features of the Montana
Rules and particularly points at which the new procedure departs from
the old.
In one particular, namely, Rule 4 with respect to the service of process,
the Federal Rules did not provide a system for Montana. In certain par-
ticulars there have been departures from the Federal Rules; in some in-
stances existing Montana statutes or practices have been retained in prefer-
ence to adopting the Federal Rules. Illustrations' are the Rules with re-
spect to the pleading of statutes,' dismissals of actions,' examination of wit-
nesses,' service of subpoenas,' examination and selection of jurors,' instruc-
tions to juries,' findings by the court," and summary judgment."
Nevertheless, the basic pattern of the Federal Rules has been retained.
These Rules were built upon the foundation of the Field Code of 1848,
*Dixon Professor of Law, Montana State University; Member of the Montana Bar;
LL.B. 1924, A.B. 1926, University of South Dakota; S.J.D. 1927, Harvard Law
School; Vice-Chairman, Montana Civil Rules Commission.
'The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure are not rules of court; they were enacted
into law by the legislature and can only be changed by legislation. Laws of Mont.
1955, ch. 255, §§ 9, 10. However, they will be referred to as the Montana Rules in
accordance with the legislative terminology (Rule 85) and often in contradistinc-
tion to superseded code provisions or code practice. A parallel citation table will
be found infra, page 61, giving for each Montana Rule the corresponding section
number in Title 93, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will often be referred to merely as the Federal Rules.
'Rule 1.
'Rules 1 and 86(a).
'The commission note to each rule used as an illustration indicates the departure
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which has afforded the basis for practice in the district courts of Montana
since territorial days, but they effect five basic and significant improve-
ments. First, pleadings are simplified and de-emphasized. Second, separ-
ate preliminary steps in the trial of a law suit are avoided and dilatory
mechanisms eliminated. Third, provisions with respect to joinder of causes
and parties are freed from inflexible restrictions that really do not promote
trial convenience. Fourth, processes by which facts may be discovered be-
fore trial are greatly liberalized. And fifth, provision is made for pre-
trial conferences, designed to facilitate getting to the merits of con-
troveries.
II. SOME MATERIALS ON THE FEDERAL RULESs
Perhaps the first question which will occur to attorneys who have not
practiced extensively in federal district courts is this: where may one go
for materials on the Federal Rules, which have now become relevant to
interpretation of Montana procedure? A great deal of such material has
accumulated over the period of twenty-three years since the Federal Rules
became effective, and it is not believed that any useful purpose would be
subserved by an attempt at a complete bibliography. All that will be at-
tempted here is to indicate where the text of the Federal Rules and deci-
sions construing them may be found, to describe the principal index books
to these decisions," to briefly appraise specialized treatises and other pub-
lications, and to cite a few articles which the writer would recommend.'
A. PUBLICATIONS IN, GENERAL USE CONTAINING THE TEXT OF THE
FEDERAL RULES
A practitioner in the Montana district courts will sometimes wish to
compare the text of the Federal Rules with that of the Montana Rules.
There are a number of sources, one or some of which will be available to
and in use by nearly every Montana lawyer, which carry the text of the
Federal Rules. Volume 308 of the official United States Reports contains
the Rules as originally adopted, and volume 335 contains the amendments
of 1948. Also the unofficial Lawyers' Edition carries the original Rules
in volume 82 and 1948 amendments in volume 91." Of course, the fact that
the original Rules and the Amendments are in separate volumes detracts
from the value of these reports as reference works; and volume 17 of the
United States Supreme Court Digest (West Publishing Co.) and also volume
17 of the Digest of United States Supreme Court Reports (Lawyers Co-op.
Publishing Co., 1959) carry the text of the Federal Rules as amended.
However, none of these publications contains the Notes of the Advisory
Committee on the Rules, which are frequently valuable aids to an under-
standing of the Rules.
'sMiss Gwendolyn Folsom, while in her former position as Research Assistant, Mon-
tana State University School of Law, rendered valuable aid to the writer by col-
lecting and sorting materials and citations to materials dealing with the Federal
Rules.1 Accoring to Corpus Juris Secunum, as of 1960 there were nearly 45,000 judicial
determinations under the Federal Rules. 35A C.J.S., page v.
'A rather extensive review of publications, 'other than articles in law reviews and
bar association journals, is found in Fowler, Available Research Materials on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 9 ALA. L. REiv. 259 (1956-57).
'
6The unofficial Supreme Court Reporter carries the 1948 amendments in Vol. 66.
[Vol. 23,
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Other source materials which contain the text of the Federal Rules
as amended and also the Notes of the Advisory Committee are of greater
value. The United States Code sets out the Rules in the Appendix to Title
28 (1958 edition), and in 1960 there was completed a six volume recom-
pilation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure portion of the United States
Code Annotated. Also Federal Code Annotated in 1952 published a volume
devoted to the Rules of various federal courts, and included the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. REPORTS OF DECISIONS
There are a few decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
which can be found in the official and unofficial reports of the decisions
of that court, and there are some decisions of United States courts of ap-
peal, which are reported in Federal Reporter, Second Series, interpreting
the Rules. However, most of the decisions on the Federal Rules are those
of the United States district courts. Only selected decisions of these dis-
trict courts are reported in Federal Supplement, and West Publishing Com-
pany has published another set of reports, Federal Rules Decisions, which
reports the many district court decisions that have been designated for
inclusion in Federal Rules Decisions rather than in Federal Supplement
because of their special importance in the construction of the Federal
Rules." Consequently, one of the reports of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Federal Reporter, Second Series, Federal Sup-
plement, and the Federal Rules Decisions are needed to obtain a complete
coverage of all federal decisions interpreting, construing and applying the
Federal Rules. Of course, state cases dealing with state rules of civil pro-
cedure patterned after the Federal Rules are to be found in the regional
Reporters of the National Reporter System.
C. PUBLICATIONS IN GENERAL USE APFORDING INDICES TO DECISIONS
Citators, digests and encyclopedias which are in general use afford
access to decisions of courts interpreting the Federal Rules and state rules
patterned after the Federal Rules. Shepard's Federal Reporter Citations
contains a division entitled "Rules of Civil Procedure, United States Dis-
trict Courts," and cites federal cases under each Rule number. Volume 17
of United States Supreme Court Digest (West Publishing Co.) should
also be placed in this category, since it merely cites decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
There are several digests. After the adoption of the Federal Rules a
new topic, "Federal Civil Procedure," was added to the key number sys-
tem of the American Digest System, which covers procedure before the
United States District courts. The same topic is also contained in the
Montana Digest and the Montana and Pacific Digest. Modern Federal
"There is no duplication of cases reported in Federal Supplement and Federal Rules
Decisions. Volume 1 of Federal Rules Decisions contains the original Rules as
they became effective in 1938; volume 5 contains the Advisory Committee Report
of Proposed Amendments; and Volume 6 contains the text of the 1948 amendments.
Federal Rules Decifsions also contains numerous articles, speeches and discussions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and since 1946 it has contained decisions
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Practice Digest (West Publishing Co.) has 4 volumes devoted to a digest
of federal cases since 1939 under the key number system of analysis.' But
there are other digests which have the advantage of having the cases keyed
to individual Rule numbers.19 The United States Code Annotated contains
comprehensive annotations under each Rule, covering not only decisions of
the federal courts but also those of state courts and opinions of the Attor-
ney General of the United States, construing and applying the Rules; and
the six volumes of Title 28 which cover the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure may be purchased separately. Also the Rule volume of the Federal
Code Annotated includes under each rule annotations to the decisions of
federal courts. Again the Digest of United States Supreme Court Reports
(volume 17, Lawyers Co-op. Publishing Co., 1959), in addition to case
notes, contains citations to annotations in American Law Reports and
American Law Reports, Second Series.
Encyclopedias not only contain text materials but also afford indices to
the primary authority of decisions. In 1960, Corpus Juris Secondum pub-
lished volumes 35A and 35B under the title "Federal Civil Procedure."
American Jurisprudence still prints applicable materials under the title
"Pleading," but the General Index has a heading "Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." Neither of these works is keyed to individual Rule numbers.'
D. SPECIALIZED PUBLICATIONS
As has been noted, Federal Rules Decisions is needed for a complete
coverage of decisions of the United States district courts construing and
applying the Federal Rules. In addition, there are specialized treatises,
services, digests and form books devoted entirely or partially to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, with which the bench and bar should be
familiar."
There are two comprehensive and outstanding treatises. Barron and
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure with Forms (Rules edition,
Wright revision), is concise, well indexed, and a useful guide to
relevant authorities. Approximately two-thirds of it is devoted to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The balance is concerned with federal
jurisdiction and federal criminal procedure. One volume is devoted to
forms, one to tables of cases and statutes, and one to a general index.' This
"'The Federal Digest is the repository of the case digests for the period prior to 1939.
"References to the Digest Key Numbers are contained in "Library References"
under each Montana Rule in the pamphlet Montana, Rules of Civil Procedure pub-
lished by West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1961 ($4.00).
'The price is $10.00 per volume.
"Reference to Corpus Juris Secundum section numbers are contained in "Library
References" under each Montana Rule in the pamphlet Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure published by West Publishing Co. (1961).
"Some specialized works have been omitted from discussion because of the relatively
small proportion devoted to civil procedure.
'St. Paul, Minn.; West Publishing Co.; Brooklyn, N. Y.; E. Thompson Co., 1950-51
($170). Montana lawyers have had their attention directed to this work through
the Federal Rules Tables in the pamphlet containing the Proposed Montana Rules
of Civil Procedure prepared by the Montana Civil Rules Commission which was
distributed to members of the bar in April, 1960, and in the pamphlet containing
the Montana Rules as enacted into law, both published by West Publishing Co.
These tables, prepared by the publisher, key the Montana Rules to the Federal
Rules and to sections of BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE ANn PROCEDURE,
containing expositions of the Federal Rules. The second of these pamphlets also
contains under each Rule a "Library Reference" to BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDIMAL
P MACTcE AND PROCWURM
[Vol. 23,
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work, prepared by eminent authors,' first appeared in 1950. The volumes
dealing with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been revised by
Charles Alan Wright,' and it is kept to date with pocket parts.
Moore's Federal Practice (second edition) ' is in eight volumes. One
volume is devoted to an index, one to federal jurisdiction, and the remain-
ing six are devoted to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The work first
appeared in 1948, but the Rules division of the work was not completed
until 1957." Portions of it have been recompiled, and it is kept to date
was annual cumulative supplements. It employs a compression-type loose-
leaf binder which permits the addition of the supplemental materials and
recompilations without the looseness of pages associated with ordinary
loose-leaf binders, and the removal of chapter units for separate use.
The author is a distinguished authority and not unknown in Mon-
tana." He was well equipped to produce an outstanding work, since he
served as adviser and draftsman in formulating the original Federal Rules
in 1938 and the subsequent amendments while a member of the United
States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The analysis and synthesis of materials is excellent, and the discussions
and criticisms of the law are valuable.
A treatise containing a scholarly treatment of pre-trial procedure was
written in 1950 by Harry D. Nims' and published in one volume. This
book, Pre-Trial,' discusses the nature of pre-trial, how it is used and prob-
lems involved in its use, and contains judicial comments on pre-trial. An
appendix contains minutes of pre-trial hearings, pre-trial rules, specimen
orders, minutes and statements prepared during or at the close of pre-trial
hearings, and a bibliography.
Bender's Federal Practice Manual (1956 Reprint)8' is a one volume
work in the compression-type loose-leaf binder, originally published in
1948. There have been recompilations of the various portions, and it is
kept up to date with supplements. It covers not only the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure but also the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and cur-
rent Court Rules of individual federal courts, and contains selected annota-
tions and citations to Moore's Federal Practice (second edition) and Ben-
der's Federal Practice Forms. It is useful primarily as a fast desk book.
For the trial lawyer whose frequent appearance in federal and Mon-
tana district courts justifies the expenditure, Federal Rules Service, Second
"The late William W. Barron served as Chief of the Revision Staff for Title 28, U.S.
Code. The Honorable Alexander IHoltzoff is United States District Judge of the
District of Columbia.
2'Professor of Law, Texas University School of Law, member of the United States
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure.
'Albany, N. Y.; Matthew Bender & Co., 1948 ($175).
'Paradoxically, volume 1, which is on federal jurisdiction, was completed last.
"'He received a B.S. degree from Montana State College in 1924, was admitted to
practice in Montana in 1937 and is a member of the Montana Bar Association. He
is Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School, and a member of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States.
"2Member, New York Bar.
"New York, N.Y.; Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., 1950 ($5.75). The original plan of
the author was to publish this book as one of the handbooks of the Committee on
Continuing Education for Lawyers of the American Law Institute, but this was
given up because of the length of the book. The text is about 200 pages in length;
the appendix somewhat over 100 pages.
"'Albany, N.Y., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., ($25).
19611
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Series' is available. This is a loose-leaf biweekly reporting service, report-
ing all current opinions construing the Federal Rules.' Bound volumes"
reporting opinions beginning in July, 1958, are available to subscribers to
the current service. The annual subscription charge' includes any bound
volume published during the subscription period.
Federal Rules Digest (second edition)" contains citations to Federal
Rules Service and is a suitable companion work for it. It is a four-volume
work which was published in 1955, equipped with pockets to take care of
periodic cumulative supplementation. It contains the text of the Federal
Rules, digests of all federal decisions interpreting the Federal Rules, and
references to leading law review articles, comments and notes.
The practioner may feel the need of forms in addition to the official
forms in the appendix to the Montana Rules. ' Bender's Federal Practice
Forms,' by Louis R. Frumer, affords a comprehensive source. This five-
volume work, in compression-type loose-leaf binders, furnishes practice
forms authorized or suggested by the United States Code, with supporting
annotations and citations to Moore's Federal Practice. Approximately
three and one-half of the five volumes are keyed to the Federal Rules.
Frumer completed this work in 1955 but portions have been recompiled
and it is kept up to date with supplements. Also, there is West's Federal
Forms." This is an eight-volume work, completed in 1953 and kept to date
with pocket supplements. It contains annotated forms not only for prac-
tice in United States district courts but also other federal courts. Three of
the eight volumes are devoted to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
The writer believes that members of the Montana bench and bar should
have available, at least until such time as the Supreme Court of Montana has
rendered a considerable body of decisions interpreting and applying the
Montana Rules, not only Federal Rules Decisions but also either Barron
and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure with Forms (Rules edition,
Wright revision) or Moore's Federal Practice (Second edition). In ad-
dition, at least unless more general digests are available, Federal Rules
Digest is recommended. The other specialized publications would be of
greater interest to the attorney who finds himself in frequent contact with
the federal courts.
"2Chicago, Ill.; Callaghan & Co.
"It also contains editorial comments.
"As of the date of this writing there are three bound volumes, available at $10 each.
Also, at last report the publishers were able to supply vols. 11-25 of the first series,
reporting opinions from 1948 through June 1958, at $10 per volume.
'The annual subscription charge is $120.
*Chicagx), Ill.; Callaghan & Co. ($60) ; $10 for pocket Darts as issued.3
'Included in the appendix of official forms are summons, various complaints, mo-
tion to dismiss, answers, counterclaim for interpleader, summons and third party
complaint, motion to intervene as defendant, motion for production and inspection,
and request for admission.
"Albany, N.Y., Matthew Bender & Co., Ina. ($120). Combined price for MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE and BENDER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE FORMS is $250.
"St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co. ($120). Combined price for BARRON AND
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, and WEST'S FEDERAL FORMS is $230.
'OA cross-reference table affords ready reference to forms under Rule number.
[Vol. 23,
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E. SOME WORTHWHILE ARTICLES'
The selection of articles in bar association journals, law reviews and
Federat Rules Decisions in sufficiently limited numbers to be of some use
is fraught with dangers of significant omissions resultant not only from
limitations in the scope of the writer's reading but also by his subjective
appraisals of worth. The writer makes no pretense of having read all
articles dealing with the Federal Rules and he is aware that others probably
would make different selections. It is with this admission and admonition
that the following articles are cited.
1. General Articles
In 1938 the Honorable John J. Parker delivered a simply written ad-
dress" which is good reading for one who has had no experience with the
Federal Rules. It does not contain a detailed technical discussion of the
Federal Rules, but it does point out the broad outlines of practice under
the Rules and demonstrates the ease with which an ordinary case may be
handled under them.
A much more extended and detailed treatment is contained in a series
of lectures in 1940 by the Honorable Alexander Holtzoff." The first five
sections" are significant in relation to the Montana Rules and include a
treatment of pleadings, parties, discovery, and procedures at trial. Only
the subject of pre-trial procedure is superficially treated." At the end of
each lecture Judge Holtzoff" entertained questions from the floor, and
these questions and his answers are set forth at the end of each section of
the article. Of course, these lectures ante-dated the amendments to the
Federal Rules, but in 1954 Judge Holtzoff published an article entitled,
"A Judge Looks at the Rules After Fifteen Years. "', This article stands
by itself as a good summary of the salient features of the Rules and the
amendments. Together with the Boston lectures it affords an excellent
general coverage of the Federal Rules.
Of the many other general articles which have been written a 1952
study by the Honorable Leon R. Yankwich deserves special mention." A
"There are two works previously referred to which contain citations to articles.
BARRON AND HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS (Rules ed.,
Wright rev.), volume 3A, supplemented iii pocket part, contains a bibliography of
articles in bar association journals and law reviews, indexed by author, subject
and periodical. FEDERAL RULs DECISIONS, in volume 20 (1958) contains an index
to articles in volumes 1-20, and an index in individual volumes covers current
articles in bar association journals and law reviews. The INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODI-
CALS (New York, H. W. Wilson Co., 1908 to date) indexes all leading articles, notes,
case comments, and book reviews published in the principal American, British, and
British Colonial periodicals.
"Handling a Case Under the New Federal Rules, 24 A.B.A.J. 793, 857 (1938), ad-
dress before the Virginia State Bar Association.
"*Practice Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 BOsTON U. L. REv. 179
(1940).
"They cover somewhat over 100 pages.
"Judge Holtzoff said of Federal Rule 16 that to dilate this subject at length would
be "like carrying coals to Newcastle, for Boston is almost as much the home of
pre-trial procedure as it is the home of baked beans." 20 BOSTON U. L. REV. at 200.
"Mr. Holtzoff has been United States District Judge for the District of Columbia
since 1945.
-'15 F.R.D. 155 (1954).
"Chief Characteristics of Federal Trial Practice in Civil Cases, 12 F.R.D. 269
(1952), being a study which afforded the basis for a lecture by the Chief Judge
of the United States District Court, Southern California, delivered at a meeting of
the Nevada State Bar Association.
1961]
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good basic coverage is preceded by a Table of Contents and supported by
numerous citations to treatises, articles and cases.
2. Articles on Specific Subjects
a. Pleadings, Motions and Parties
A good comparison of the first 25 Federal Rules with the common
law and code systems is contained in an article by Bernard C. Gavit writ-
ten in 1939." The purpose and philosophy of the Federal Rules is con-
sidered in a concise treatment of the form of allegations, motions, answers
and parties, but withoub attempt at exhaustive citations of authorities.
A detailed discussion of devices for joinder of claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims and parties, under Federal Rules 13 to 24, compared with code
practice, is contained in an article by Charles Alan Wright, published in
1952.w
b. Summary Judgment
The Honorable Charles E. Clark," in an article written in 1952, treats
generally the vital characteristics of summary judgment procedure, its his-
tory, and its position under the Federal Rules as an important adjunct
of discovery and as a part of the series of devices designed for the swift
uncovering of the merits of controversies."
A well annotated discussion of summary judgments under Federal
Rule 56 is contained in an article written in 1953 by Mac Asbill and Willis
B. Snell.' The article considers not only the issue of what is a disputable
fact but also how a party shows that an issue of fact exists."
c. Discovery
Of the many excellent articles on discovery under the Federal Rules
it is believed that three will sufficie to give an insight into these important
mechanisms. An early article by the Honorable Alexander Holtzoff con-
tains a good general discussion of the various discovery instruments.' An
excellent treatment oriented to the important decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Hickman v. Taylor,' involving protection of the
work product of the lawyer, was written by Charles R. Taine in 1950.'
'"The New Federal Rules and State Procedure, 25 A.B.A.J. 367, 435 (1939). Mr. Gavit
was Dean of the Indiana University School of Law.
wJoinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. REv. 580.
This article was one based on materials presented at an Institute on the new Min-
nesota Rules and is one of several in a symposium.5 United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit; formerly Reporter and Member of Ad-
visory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of the United States :
Member of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.TThe Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REv. 567, in symposium.
'Members, District of Columbia Bar.
"Summary Judgment Under the Fedcral Rules-When an Issue of Fact is Presented,
51 MicH. L. REv. 1143 (1953). In reading this article, one should keep in mind
that the Montana Rule departs from the Federal Rule by providing that affidavits
shall not be considered for any purpose on motion for summary judgment.
'Instruments of Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MIcH.
L. REv. 205 (1941).6329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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And a good investigative study of the use of discovery devices during thir-
teen years of their use in federal courts was written in 1951 by William H.
Speck.'
d. Pre-Trial Procedure
Of the many articles on pre-trial procedure under Federal Rule 16, one
by the Honorable Alfred P. Murrah' deserves special mention. This article,
published in 1954, was prepared by Judge Murrah as Chairman of the
Pre-Trial Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Al-
though it was prepared for the benefit of newly appointed federal judges,
it is also valuable to members of the bar. It is a brief but clear discussion
of the purposes of pre-trial procedure and its techniques. Appended to
it are samples of notices and orders and a bibliography briefly indicating
the contents of books, articles and demonstrations.'
Procedures in the trial of protracted cases was the subject of a Report
of the Judicial Conference Study Group, which was adopted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States in March, 1960." This is a Hand-
book intended to serve as a guide to judges and lawyers. It is a com-
pendium of ideas and suggestions of able judges and trial counsel.
e. Masters
The proper use of masters under Federal Rule 53 as an aid to courts
in the exercise of their jurisdiction, in both non-jury and jury cases, and
limitations upon reference are discussed in an article published in 1958
by the Honorable Irving R. Kaufman.'
3. Articles on State Rules
At the conclusion of this limited list of articles, it may be useful to
refer to comparisons made in other states of newly adopted state Rules
patterned after the Federal Rules with prior state practice similar to that
which has existed in Montana.' Professor Frank J. Trelease" in 1958 dis-
cussed the principal changes made in the Wyoming practice by the adop-
tion of Rules patterned after the Federal Rules.' Professor Charles L.
Crum" in 1957 made a similar comparison, with illustrations, of the North
Dakota practice.'
5The Use of Discovery in the United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132. This
article was based on information gathered by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
"United States Circuit Judge, Tenth Circuit; chairman of the Judicial Conference
Study Group on Protracted Litigation.
OPre-Trial Procedure, a Statement of its Essentials, 14 F.R.D. 417 (1954).
!'As adopted the report is entitled Handbook of Recommended Procedure for the
Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
6United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York. Masters in
the Federal Courts; Rule 53, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 452 (1958), in symposium.
'Of course, some differences exist in the procedure of states which may be said to
have adopted the Field Code of 1848.
'Dean and Professor of Law, University of Wyoming School of Law. Wyoming in
1869 adopted the system of procedure inaugurated by the Field Code.
'Wyoming Practice, 12 Wyo. L. REv. 203 (1958), in symposium.
mAssociate Professor of Law, North Dakota University School of Law. North Da-
kota in 1862 adopted the system of procedure inaugurated by the Field Code.
'Summary of North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 N. DAK. L. REV. 287 (1957).
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III. PROCESS AND SERVICE
A. JURISDICTION AND ORIGINAL PROCESS
In dealing with persons subject to the jurisdiction of Montana district
courts, and process and service of process, one encounters diverse problems.
Provisions of the code and of the Federal Rules furnish a pattern for the
form of process and its service in general. However, as to persons subject
to jurisdiction and service to make an expanded personal jurisdiction ef-
fective such provisions are inadequate. The code provisions are geared to
much more limited concepts of personal jurisdiction than exist today; and
the Federal Rules are not fitted to state requirements, because federal
courts do not have the problems which state courts have, resultant from
the fact that each state is a member of a union of equal sovereign states.
Consequently, in drafting Montana Rule 4, the pattern was furnished in
part by drafts of the Uniform Extra-Territorial Process Act and recent
legislation in other states, particularly Illinois, Texas and Wisconsin. '
1. Expanded Personal Jurisdiction
Subdivision B of Montana Rule 4 provides not only that all persons,
resident or non-resident, found within the state are subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of this state, but also that all, persons, even though
not found within the state, are subject to such jurisdiction in specified
cases. As is stated in the Commission Note to Proposed Rule:
This rule expands the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
non-residents in cases having substantial contacts with Montana.
It is in accord with a trend that began more than thirty years ago
with the non-resident motorist acts.' The constitutional basis for
such expanded jurisdiction is afforded by such decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States as International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 66 S.Ct. 154, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and McGee v. In-
ternational Life Ins. Co., 78 S.Ct. 199, 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In
these decisions the Court departed materially from the rigid rule
of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), although, as was pointed
out in Hanson v. Denckla, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958),
the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff has not wholly disappeared. Under
the new and flexible standard of due process a state may exercise
personal jurisdiction whenever the relation between it and the
particular litigation sued upon makes it reasonable for the state
to try the particular case. In such an inquiry importance attaches
to what the defendant has caused to be done in the forum state.
The jurisdictional acts prescribed by subdivision B (1) (a) through (f)
of Montana Rule 4 include the commission of any act which results in the
accrual within this state of a tort action; the ownership, use, or possession
of any property situated in the state; and the transaction of business with-
in the state, including contracting to insure a subject within this state,
entering into a contract for personal service or materials to be furnished
within the state, acting as officer of a corporation organized under the
'Supplement to the October, 1959, WiscoNsIN BAR BULLETIN contains an excellent
review of authorities and analysis of the Wisconsin statute effective July 1, 1960,
written by Professor G. W. Foster, Jr., of the University of Wisconsin Law School.
6REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 53-201 to -206. (Hereinafter REVISEz CODES
OF MONTANA will be cited R.C.M.)
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laws of this state or having its principal place of business here, and acting
as executor or administrator of any local estate. Some of these would sat-
isfy older concepts of personal jurisdiction based upon consent, presence
or doing business within the state. Others would not satisfy such territorial
limitations, but would seem to satisfy the more recent requirements of a
contact which has a substantial connection with the state.
In order to afford effective means of acquiring jurisdiction in these
cases which are "subject to jurisdiction" it is necessary to enlarge the old
methods of serving process. States no longer are hampered by a rule that
process has no validity beyond the territorial limits of the state wherein
it is issued. The question under more recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States is not whether there has been service within
the state, but rather whether there has been a process which provides ade-
quate and reasonable notice." Accordingly, subdivision D(3) of the Mon-
tana Rule provides that: "Where service upon any person cannot, with
due diligence, be made personally within this state, service of summons and
complaint may be made by service outside this state in the manner provided
for service within this state, with the same force and effect as though
service had been made within this state. . .. " Such service is not complete
until the expiration of 20 days after the date of service,' thus extending the
time for answer to 40 days after service" and affording ample opportunity
to appear and defend. Except for service upon the Montana Secretary of
State in those cases where an agent to receive service of process cannot be
served within Montana,8 older methods of substituted service which do not
guarantee that the defendant receive actual notice of the litigation, such
as leaving at the defendant's abode or service by publication, are not con-
templated in actions in personam. The Rule contains no provision at all
for service by leaving at the defendant's place of abode, and subdivision
D(5) (a) permits service by publication only in actions in rem or quasi in
,rem.
2. The Summons
Subdivision C of Rule 4 requires the clerk of court to issue summons.
As under the Federal Rule, he is directed to issue it "forthwith" upon the
filing of the complaint." The form of summons specified by Rule 4C(2)
and Official Form 1 is substantially the same as that provided by the code
provision which is superseded.' While under Rule 4D(7) summons may
be amended in the discretion of the court, Official Form 1 should be fol-
lowed to avoid all questions with respect to its validity.
3. Manner of Service
a. Personal Service
Summons and complaint must be served together, as under code prac-
tice ;"8 and the manner of making personal service is spelled out in detail
"McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Travelers Health
Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
'Rule 4D (5) (g).
"Rule 12(a).
'Rule 4D(6).
"R.C.M., 1947, § 93-3002, providing, inter alia, that the plaintiff may have summons
issued at any time within one year after the complaint is filed, has not been super-
seded or repealed.
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in eight subdivisions of Rule 4D(2). Each of the subdivisions deals with
a different type of defendant, as follows: (a) an individual other than an
infant or incompetent person; (b) a minor over the age of 14 years; (c) a
minor under the age of 14 years; (d) a person adjudged of unsound mind
or an incompetent for whom a guardian has been appointed; (e) a domestic
corporation, partnership or unincorporated association; (f) a foreign cor-
poration, partnership or unincorporated association; (g) a political sub-
division of the state and its agencies; and (h) the state and its agencies.
More particularity is contained in the Rule than in the code provisions, and
strict compliance with the provisions of the Rule should assure valid
service.
b. Service by Publication
The manner of service by publication is prescribed by Rule 4D(5),
and follows the familiar pattern of the code. However, the Rule requires
publication only three successive weeks, rather than four as required by the
code; and service is not complete until 20 days after the last publication,
rather than on the date of the last publication as under the code.' This
may not control special statutory proceedings since Rule 81(a) excepts
such proceedings insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the
procedure prescribed by the Rules. Thus it would seem that the provisions
for publication for four successive weeks in suits to quiet title should be
followed.
c. Service on the Secretary of State
"Unless otherwise provided by statute," service on the Montana Secre-
tary of State is permitted in accordance with the provisions of subdivision
D(6) of Montana Rule 4 whenever the Secretary has been appointed, or is
deemed to have been appointed as agent to receive service of process for
any person who cannot with due diligence be found or served personally
within Montana. The Rule does not specify when the Secretary shall be
deemed to have been appointed such agent; that is left for other legislation.
The code provisions, which require a foreign corporation, before doing busi-
ness in the state, to designate a citizen of this state as agent upon whom
service of process may be made in actions arising within this state, and
which provide for service upon the Secretary of State under prescribed cir-
cumstances where the designated agent cannot be found, continue in effect."
The procedures for substituted service on the Secretary of State under
the code and under the Rule are similar, but there are differences in de-
tail. For instance, the affidavit required under the code, but not under
the Rule, must contain a statement that the plaintiff has a good cause of
action on the merits; and the affidavit required by the Rule, but not by
the code, must state the residence and last known post office address of
the person to be served. The code, by virtue of a 1961 amendment,' re-
quires payment to the Secretary of a fee of $5, whereas the fee specified
by the Rule is $3. Under the code, but not under the Rule, the clerk of court
must make an order directing service on the Secretary. The code does not
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3014. A defendant has 20 days after the completion of service
of process to serve his answer. Rule 12(a).
"'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-6208.
10R.C.M. 1947, §§ 15-1701, 15-1702, 93-3008, 93-3009, 93-3010, 93-3011.
uLaws of Mont. 1961, ch. 117, § 17.
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specify who shall make service on the Secretary, but the Rule requires serv-
ice by the sheriff of Lewis and Clark County. The code requires that the
papers be sent by registered mail to the person to be served; the Rule per-
mits them to be sent either by registered or certified mail. Under the code
a return receipt is required, which must be attached to the Secretary's
certificate of mailing. Under the Rule no return receipt is required if
the Secretary is advised by the postal authorities that delivery was re-
fused, thus avoiding a question which exists under the code provision as to
the validity of service where a defendant refuses to accept the registered
letter containing the process.'
Since provisions for substituted service unknown to the common law
are involved, there must be substantial compliance with the provisions of
the code or Rule,' whichever is applicable. Consequently, it is of prime
importance to observe the differences in the procedure.
4. Proof of Service
The provisions of Rule 4 for proof of service' are similar to the code
provisions" although when personal service is made by a person other than
the sheriff or person designated by law the requirements for the affidavit
of service are tightened somewhat. It is expressly required that such affi-
davit state that the person so serving is of legal age, the date and place of
service, and that the person making the service knew the person served to
be the person named in the papers served and the person intended to be
served.' Within the discretion of the court, proof of service may be
amended.'
B. NOTIFICATION AND RECORDING OF PROGRESS OF ACTION
Provisions for notification by service and recording by filing with the
court of the progress of an action, after jurisdiction over the parties has
been obtained, is made by Rule 5. Subdivision (a) enumerates papers and
pleadings subsequent to the original complaint which are required to be
served, but the enumeration is not exhaustive. Thus, although not listed
in Rule 5 (a), affidavits in support of and in opposition to motions are re-
quired to be served by Rule 6(d), written interrogatories for the taking of
depositions are required to be served by Rule 31 (a), written interrogatories
to be answered must be served as provided in Rule 33, and requests for ad-
mission must be served as provided in Rule 36(a).
Under Rule 5 (a), a party who is in default for failure to appear is not
entitled to notice of acts done or proceedings in an action, except that he
must be served with pleadings asserting new or additional claims for re-
"The common law doctrine that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed would render the service invalid under the code provisions, al-
though a common sense interpretation of the statute would seem to lead to a con-
trary result. Dwyer v. Shalck, 232 App. Div. 780, 248 N.Y.S. 355 (1931) held the
service invalid. Wax v. Van Marter, 124 Pa. Super. 573, 189 Atl. 537 (1937) held
it valid. The matter is commented upon in 85 U. PA. L. Ruv. 739 (1936).
'Hinton v. Staunton, 124 Mont. 534, 542, 228 P.2d 461 (1951); West v. Capitol Trust
& Savings Bank, 113 Mont. 130, 142, 124 P.2d 572 (1942); Rothrock v. Bauman,
73 Mont. 401, 403, 236 Pac. 1077 (1925).
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lief in the manner prescribed for the service of summons in Rule 4. But
if a party has made an appearance, his subsequent default by failure to
plead within the time prescribed by the Rules does not affect his right to
notice; he is entitled to the same notice of acts done and proceedings taken
as a party who has not defaulted.'
Service may be made by any person, even by the party or his attorney,
and the Montana Rule has added subdivision (f) requiring proof of service
to be made by acknowledgment, affidavit, or, if service is made by a resident
attorney, by certificate. The Rule provides that the proof of service shall
be filed within 10 days after service, but "failure to make proof of service
does not affect the validity of the service." It is the service which is es-
sential, not the evidence of it.
The manner of making service is specified in subdivision (b) of Rule
5. If a party is represented by an attorney, service is required to be made
upon the attorney unless the court orders service to be made on the party
himself. Service may be made by delivering a copy to the party to be
served, by mailing it to him at his last known address or, if no address is
known, by leaving it with the clerk of court. "Delivery" is defined in
detail, and includes leaving the copy at the office of the person to be
served, as specified in the Rule.
Service is complete upon mailing; but Rule 6(e) provides that, when
service is made by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period
during which a party must do any act or take any proceeding that may be
required.'M
C. COMPUTATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
Most of the provisions of Rule 6 with respect to time need little ex-
planation. The Federal Rule has been changed by placing Saturday on
the same basis as Sunday in the computation of time. Subdivision (b),
providing for the enlargement of the time for doing acts, distinguishes be-
tween (1) enlargement upon request before expiration of the period orig-
inally prescribed or extended by previous order, and (2) enlargement made
upon motion after the expiration of the specified period. In the first
situation, the court may order the period enlarged with or without motion
or notice.' In the second situation, the motion is required by Rule 7(b) (1)
to be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial. The showing re-
quired for an enlargement is also different in the two situations; in the
first, a party must show some cause; but in the second, he must show that
the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
Although the propounders of the Federal Rules are not unanimous in
their opinions, it has been held that, except where elsewhere expressly per-
mitted, stipulations for extensions of time entered into by parties are not
effective and binding without court approval.' However, Montana Rule
'See also Rule 55(b) with respect to entry of judgment by default.
.
8Cf. service upon the Secretary of State as agent for a defendant; such service is
not complete until the Secretary receives a return receipt for the papers required
to be mailed by him to the defendant, or advice that delivery was refused. Rule
4D (6).
mProfessor Moore suggests that except in cases of emergency it is advisable to fol-
low the procedure prescribed in Rule 7(b) (1). 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.08,
at 1481 (2d ed. 1948, 1960). Hereinafter, MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE: (2d ed.) will
be cited MOoRE.
90Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayhertz Amusement Corp., 130 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1942).
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55 (c) has added a provision that any stipulation for extension of time be-
tween parties or their counsel, whether in writing or made verbally before
the court, shall be effective to extend the time for serving and/or filing any
appearance, motion, pleading or proceeding, according to the terms of such
stipulation. Further, the Montana Rule provides that no default or de-
fault judgment shall be entered against any party except upon application
of the opposing party; and, in case a party in default shall serve and file
his appearance, motion, pleading or proceeding prior to application to the
clerk for default, then such defaulting party shall not thereafter be con-
sidered in default as to that particular appearance, motion, pleading or
proceeding.
The last clause of Rule 6(b) provides that the time stated in specified
R,ules cannot be enlarged even by court order, except to the extent and
under the conditions stated in the specified Rule. This applies to the 10
day periods specified in Rule 50(b) to set aside a verdict and enter judg-
ment, and to direct entry of judgment when a verdict has not been re-
turned; in Rule 52(b) to amend findings and judgment after entry of
judgment; and in Rule 59(b), (d), and (e) for service of motion for new
trial, for the court to order a new trial of its own initiative, and for service
of motion to alter or amend judgment. In addition it applies to the one-
year period set by Rule 60(b) for a motion for relief from a judgment,
order or proceeding on the first three grounds specified in that Rule.'
There may be some question as to the interpretation of this clause of Rule
6(b) in conjunction with Rule 55(c). But it would seem that default, in
the sense in which that term is used in 55(c), is not involved in the situa-
tions included in the specific prohibitions in 6(b). Furthermore, it could
hardly have been intended to permit extension by stipulation while pro-
hibiting it by court order for cause shown. Finally, the specific prohibitions
upon enlargement should control over the general provisions of 55(c)."
IV. PLEADINGS
A. THE POSITION OF PLEADINGS IN THE PROCEDURAL SCHEME
If the Montana Rules governing pleadings are to be effective and
accomplish their object, practitioners and judges must appreciate the place
which pleadings occupy in the procedural plan of the new system." These
rules respecting pleadings have devolved from prior systems. The com-
mon law emphasized the purpose of pleadings to formulate an issue for
trial. The codes of civil procedure required the pleading of facts, and
the modern tendency has been to emphasize the purpose to notify adverse
parties of the facts which will be relied upon at trial. Thus the Supreme
Court of Montana has said:
9 Montana Rule 6(b) does not incorporate the prohibitions of Federal Rule 6(b)
upon the extension of time for (1) taking of action under Rule 25, because of the
elimination from Montana Rule 25 of any specific time limitation, or (2) taking
action under Rule 73 (a) and (g), because there is no Montana Rule 73.
"Although cannons of interpretation are needed tools of argument, "to make any
cannon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be
sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the cannon." Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Cannons About How Statutes
are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950).
"For a good general summary of the purposes of pleadings, see CLARK, CODE PLEAD-
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"The object of pleading is to notify the opposite party of the facts
which the pleader expects to prove, and so it is that the allegations of such
facts must be made with that certainty which will enable the adverse party
to prepare his evidence to meet the alleged facts.""
The Montana Rules do not completely abandon these purposes, but
less is expected of pleadings in the accomplishment of these purposes than
has been expected under the code system.' This is manifest in the Montana
Rules by the simple pleadings in the official Appendix of Forms," by the
expansion of devices for discovery of facts in advance of trial,' by the
provision for pre-trial procedure," and by the limitation on the number
of pleadings."
Pleadings have been displaced from their position of prime impor-
tance,' and more effective means of accomplishing much of what has been
expected of pleadings have been added.
B. FORMAL MATTERS
Rules 10 and 11 deal with the form and signing of pleadings. They
need little explanation, since they conform substantially to previous statutes
and practice.
Rule 10(b) with respect to separate paragraphing and separate counts
avoids reference to "cause of action" by using the term "claim." This
is also true of other Rules and is a matter which will be discussed in other
connections. It has been said that " 'claim' is essentially equivalent to
the broad and realistic concept of 'cause of action.' "'
Rule 11 provides in part that: "Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied
by affidavit." This continues in effect statutory provisions such as the
requirement that restraining orders be granted only on affidavits, unless
the complaint be positively verified.' But further, section 93-3702, Re-
vised Codes of Montana, 1947, providing that "all complaints, answers,
and replies must be verified," with certain exceptions, has not been super-
seded or expressly repealed. This introduces doubt as to whether the pur-
pose of Federal Rule 11 to do away with the requirement of verification
other than in exceptional cases is accomplished. Consequently, the safer
practice would seem to be to continue to verify pleadings as required by
section 93-3702.'
"Ritchie v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 128 Mont. 218, 222, 272 P.2d 728 (1954).
"History shows that pleadings have failed to accomplish what was expected of
them. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1943).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2711-6, Forms 2-14.
'Rules 26 through 37.
'Rule 16.
"Compare R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3601 with Rule 7(a).
"°VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND' JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION 18 (1952).
02 MooRE 10.03, at 2005 (1948, 1960). The broad concept of "cause of action" is
discussed, infra, pages 19-21.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4205.
'The argument against continuing the requirement of sections 93-3702 in effect is
that it makes verification the general rule rather than the exception as provided
by Rule 11, and is contrary to the intent of the Federal Rule and to the purpose
expressed in the enabling act under which the Montana Rules were prepared to
make possible the adoption of the federal practice so far as "presently practicable."
However, taken baldly and literally, Montana Rule 11 does continue section 93-3702
[Vol. 23,
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C. THE NUMBER OF PLEADINGS
Under the Rules pleadings are fewer and terminate earlier than under
code practice. Code practice contemplates a three stage system of plead-
ings, consisting of a complaint, an answer, and a reply whenever new mat-
ter is alleged in the answer.' The Rules allow only two stages, unless the
court in its discretion otherwise orders.' Under Rule 7(a) a reply is man-
datory only when the answer contains a counterclaim denominated as such;
and if there is a counterclaim, the reply is an answer to a claim. The
theory is that fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's de-
fense is usually given by complaint and answer.' But the courts have had
difficulty in determining whether or not an answer amounts to a counter-
claim, and the courts have not all applied the same test in determining this
question.' By confining mandatory replies to counterclaims denominated
as such, the plaintiff is protected from the peril of correctly analyzing the
defendant's answer to determine whether or not its allegations do amount
to a counterclaim, and, since the court may order a reply in cases where it
is not mandatory, there is no danger that the defendant will not be given
adequate notice of the plaintiff's position. Actually the discretionary or-
dering of a reply has not been employed to any considerable extent in fed-
eral courts, and it has been said that this is as it should be, since the broad
discovery provisions and the pre-trial conference under the Rules have
relieved the pleadings of much of the burden of formulating issues.'
D. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. Type of Pleading Envisaged
Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief
shall contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."' This should be read in conjunction with
subdivisions (e) and (f) of Rule 8, which require simple, concise and direct
averments, but no technical forms, and that all pleadings be so construed
as to do substantial justice. The Rule makes no reference to "facts" or
"cause of action," terms which have caused confusion under the code re-
quirement that the complaint contain "a statement of the facts constituting
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language."'
Facts are not such definite things as the codifiers apparently thought
they were when the Field Code was drafted in 1848, and it has been said
that "their ideal of pleading facts, as it has been worked out, has proved
probably the most unsatisfactory part of their reform."' The difficulty
in effect; and it would seem contrary to a prime purbose of the Rules to litigate a
question of this kind which has no real relation to the merits of the controversy.
If it be desired to follow the federal practice, it would seem that section 93-3702
should not be repealed but rather amended to remove the generality of the require-
ment of verification, inasmuch as it provides the form which verifications shall
take.
1'-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-3103, -3201, -3401, -3601.
'
61Blume, The Scope of the Civil Action, 42 MicH. L. REv. 257, 277 (1943).
1'02 MoopR 7.03, at 1508 (1948, 1960).
'
0 CLARK 694.
'022 MOORE 7.03, at 1508 (1948, 1960).
"This applies to counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims, as well as to
original claims.
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is with the distinction between ultimate facts, which should be pleaded,
and evidence on the one hand and conclusions on the other hand, neither
of which should be pleaded. Thus, the Supreme Court of Montana has
held that a denial that the price for goods "is now long past due and owing
from defendants to the plaintiff" does not raise an issue of fact, because
the allegation denied is a conclusion.' Much time and money have been
spent litigating questions of this kind, which have no significant relation
to the merits of the controversies involved or whether the pleadings give
fair notice of the cases relied upon by the pleaders.
Also, the phrase "cause of action" has led courts in some cases to a
conceptual theory of rights that does not promote the dispatch of litigation
on its merits or trial convenience. A case in point is presented where the
same wrongful act injures plaintiff's person and property. In such a
situation the Supreme Court of Montana has held that there are two causes
of action,' quoting with approval from a Wisconsin court as follows:
"The infallible test by which to determine whether. a complaint states
more than one cause of action is: Does it present more than one subject of
action or primary right for adjudication?"'
Not all authorities have taken such a narrow technical position. Thirty
three years ago Judge Clark defined a "cause of action" as an aggregate
of operative facts giving rise to a right or rights which will be enforced by
the courts, the number and extent of operative facts included within a
single cause of action to be determined pragmatically mainly by considera-
tions of trial convenience.' Professor Toelle, in reviewing the matter a
number of years ago, said of the Montana cases:'
Alexander v. Great Northern Railway Company,' holding a com-
plaint sustainable either under the employer's liability act or at
common law, would seem to be commendably liberal . . . as also
is the holding in Clark v. Oregon Short Line Railway Company'
• . .permitting a "perfecting" amendment after the statute of
limitations had run (i.e., addition of allegations as to defendant's
legal capacity and plaintiff's ownership of the property alleged to
have been injured).
Although the view of a cause of action as a group of operative facts as
urged by Judge Clark has gained in favor, conflict and confusion con-
tmConnelly Co. v. Schlueter Bros., 69 Mont. 65, 69, 220 Pac. 103 (1923).
"The rule followed in a majority of states is that there is only one cause of action
in this situation. 2 MoOp 2.06, at 378 (1948, 1960).
"Lennon v. City of Butte, 67 Mont. 101, 107, 214 Pac. 1101 (1923). This case dealt
with joinder of causes of action, a problem which is academic under Rule 18(a).
However, the position of the court would require two suits in a situation where
the parties and much of the evidence would be the same; and, of course, the ques-
tion of splitting as related to res judicata remains under the Rules. As Judge
Clark has said: "A rule leading to two law suits where one will accomplish the
same results is not to be favored." CLARK 489. An approach "toward a cause
of action as embracing an entire group of operative facts . . .should be utilized
by the federal courts in the treatment of res judicata insofar as they are free to
fashion the doctrine." 2 MOORE 2.06, at 378 (1948, 1960).
"'CLARK, CODE PLEADINO 75-87 (1928).
"aToelle, Joinder of Actions-With Special Reference to the Montana and California
Practice, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 459, 477 (1930).
"151 Mont. 565, 154 Pac. 914, L.R.A. 1918E 852 (1916).
1838 Mont. 177, 99 Pac. 298 (1909).
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tinues.' By substituting the phrase "claim for relief," the Federal Rules
avoided dragging this conflict into the federal system and adopted the
broad pragmatic factual approach.' ° At the same time the Federal Rules
avoided reference to "facts" and so voided controversy over the meaning
of that term. As Professor Moore has said: "The federal courts are not
hampered by the morass of decisions as to whether a particular allegation
is one of fact, evidence, or law."'' Efforts to revive the old code re-
quirement that a complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action' seem only to have strengthened the view that the Rule is desirable
and adequately sets forth the characteristics of good pleading.'
This federal system is not revolutionary. It continues to emphasize
the notice-giving function of pleadings, but complexities are avoided, and
the notice which is contemplated is of operative facts and not details which
the opponent should know or ascertain for himself. The Rules envisage
"the statement of circumstances, occurrences and events in support of the
claim presented . . . [but] are designed to discourage battles over mere
form of statement and to sweep away the needless controversies which the
codes permitted that served either to delay trial on the merits or to prevent
a party from having a trial because of mistakes in statement."'
The Montana Rules follow the federal pattern; and the appendix to
the Montana Rules contains thirteen forms of complaint, following the cor-
responding federal forms with a minor exception,' which illustrate the
purpose of the Rules to simplify pleadings without completely departing
from past practice. Thus Montana Form 4 is a complaint for goods sold
and delivered, and may be used where the action is for an agreed price
or for the reasonable value of the goods. It is as follows:
Defendant owes plaintiff ........ dollars for goods sold and
delivered by plaintiff to defendant between June 1, 1959, and De-
cember 1, 1959.
Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant for
the sum of ........ dollars, interest, and costs.
'The Supreme Court of Montana has continued to define "cause of action" in terms
of "the right which a party has to institute a judicial proceeding." Bergin v.
Temple, 111 Mont. 539, 545, 111 P.2d 286 (1941) ; Lorang v. Flathead Commercial
Co., 112 Mont. 146, 119 P.2d 273 (1941) ; Galbreath v. Armstrong, 121 Mont. 387,
395, 193 P.2d 630 (1948).
"'CLARK 146-48.
22 MOORE 8.13, at 1647 (1948, 1960).
='The Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit has recommended such a change. IA
BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 255, at 61 (1960). Here-
inafter, BARRON AND HOLTZOFF FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Rules ed. and
Wright rev.) will be cited BARRON AND HOLTZOFF. The June 1, 1960, Report of the
Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Judicial Confer-
ence for the Ninth Circuit continues to recommend return to the old code plead-
ing requirement.
'This was the conclusion of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure
in its October, 1955, report, p. 19.
"'Ibif.
'The Montana complaint for money lent, Form 5, contains an additional allegation
that the amount of the debt which defendant owes "is now due." Of course, the
jurisdictional allegations of the federal forms are omitted from the Montana
forms. Also, forms of complaints .for damages under the Merchant Marine Act
(Federal Form 15), for infringement of patent (Federal Form 16), and for in-
fringement of copyright and unfair competition (Federal Form 17), are inappro-
priate to Montana practice and are omitted from the Montana forms.
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This form is substantially one of the common counts used at common
law and appears to have been copied from a form used in Massachusetts.'
It is, of course, a summary mode of pleading, but it has been almost uni-
versally upheld under the code system."2 In Montana the Supreme Court
has sustained a pleading only a little less general,'" and has said:
"If the phraseology of any common count is adequate in the particular
case to bring the pleader within the code rule, then his pleading is suf-
ficient.' "'
Again, Montana Form 8, which is a complaint for negligence, alleges:
1. On June 1, 1959, in a public highway called State Street,
in Helena, Montana, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle
against the plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.
2. As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg bro-
ken and was otherwise injured, was prevented from transacting
his business, suffered great pain of body and mind, and incurred
expenses for medical attention and hospitalization in the sum of
........ dollars.
Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant in
the sum of ------ dollars and costs.
This form is not just a claim for damages for defendant's negligence.
Rather it isolates this accident from others by designating the time and
place where it occurred and stating the type of accident. It is quite in ac-
cord with common law precedents and the better code cases,'9 and the
Supreme Court of Montana has sustained the pleading of negligence with
little, if any, greater detail.'
These are illustrations of what is sufficient to give fair notice of the
elements of the plaintiff's claim.' The inquiry is not whether "conclu-
sions" or "facts" are stated, but whether the requirement of a "short and
plain" statement has been met. However, neither the Rules nor the Forms
are intended to state rigid formulae. Both are intended to leave a large
measure of discretion to the trial court in developing pleadings to fit best
the particular situation, and in the exercise of this discretion a certain
amount of freedom should be accorded to any lawyer in determining the
detail to be put into his pleading."
2. Alternative and Hypothetical Pleadings
The Rules take an advanced step with respect to alternative pleadings.
Even at common law a pleader could state his case alternatively in differ-
ent counts; under Montana code practice the position was taken that it was
not necessary to use different counts,'' but it was held that when allegations
"m2 CHinrv, TREATISE ON PLEADINGS 33-34 (16th ed. 1882).
"CLRKax 287.
"'DeMers v. O'Leary, 126 Mont. 528, 254 P.2d 1080 (1953).
'Turo v. Passmore, 38 Mont. 544, 549, 100 Pac. 966 (1909).
'CLARK 300-03.
"'For instance, Manning v. Zeiler, 127 Mont. 248, 261 P.2d 807 (1953).
mIt has been said that the final test of a pleading is whether it sufficiently Isolates
the events in question from others to permit the application of res judicata to the
final judgment entered. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 461 (1943).
"CLARK 244; Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D., 456, 461 (1943).
'
3 McGrath v. Dubs, 127 Mont. 101, 257 P.2d 899 (1953).
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were in the alternative in one count each allegation would have to be suf-
ficient.' The Rules not only permit pleading in the alternative in a single
count, but recognize that such a pleading is sufficient if one alternative is
good.M No better notice is given merely because separate counts are used,
and there seems to be no reason for holding that alternatives may be used
as separate counts, without the necessity of each being sufficient, while hold-
ing otherwise when the averments are not separated.
A somewhat similar problem, involving the degree of certainty to be
required of the pleader, is presented by hypothetical pleadings. If a
pleader is not certain that a particular set of facts correctly states his
claim, he may wish to frame his averments contingently. There seems to
be no good reason not to permit this, if the pleader has truthfully stated
his position and the pleading is sufficient to give his opponent notice of
what he may seek to prove." The Rules treat alternative and hypothetical
pleadings together, and permit hypothetical pleading.'TM
3. Averments of Fraud, Mistake and Condition of the Mind
Specific details have been required under the codes generally in allega-
tions bringing defendant's morality into question. This applies when a
defendant is charged with fraud.' The Montana Supreme Court has said:
"The employment of such extravagant terms as 'fraud,' and other
words of like malign import, unaccompanied by a statement of fact upon
which the charges of wrongdoing rest, is a useless waste of words."'
Rule 9(b) continues this requirement as to fraud and also requires
that error constituting an alleged mistake must be specifically indicated.
The provision is that, "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circum-
stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
This, however, does not apply to averments of the condition of mind
of a person, the Rule providing that "Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." The reason for
this has been said to be that specific averment of condition of the mind is
normally well-nigh impossible unless all the evidence bearing thereon is
set out at length."'
E. RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS
1. Simple Non-Technical Defenses Envisaged
The philosophy which applies to pleadings setting forth claims also
applies to pleadings stating defenses. Rule 8(b) provides that a party
shall state his defenses in "short and plain terms"; and the requirements
that averments be simple, concise, and direct, without technical forms,"
and that pleadings be so construed as to do substantial justice,'" apply to
defenses as well as to claims. Consequently, ag is true with respect to a
'Pollard v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 92 Mont. 119, 127, 11 P.2d 271 (1932).
'Rule 8(e) (2).
"WCLARK 257-58.
'Rule 8(e) (2). There has been less tendency under the codes to relax the rule
against hypothetical pleadings. CLARK 257.
mCLARK 312.
"'Brandt v. McIntosh, 47 Mont. 70, 72, 130 Pac. 413 (1913).
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pleading setting forth a claim, the sufficiency of a pleading stating a
defense should not be judged by inquiring whether it avers "facts" or
"conclusions."'" Further, the Rule permitting alternative and hypo-
thetical averments,' and the Rule with respect to averments of fraud, mis-
take, and condition of the mind,' apply to defenses as well as claims. The
question is whether the averment is definite enough to inform the plaintiff
of the defense he must be prepared to meet.'
2. Special Defenses
The Rules continue the Montana code rule' that "new matter," which
in general comprehends the subject matter of pleas in abatement"' and in
confession and avoidance' at common law, must be affirmatively pleaded.
Under Rule 8(c) any matter "constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense" should be affirmatively pleaded. 1 But the Rule is framed to
avoid litigation as to the character of particular defenses. Under the codes
there has been some conflict as to the defenses of payment and estoppel,
and considerable conflict as to the defenses of the statute of frauds, con-
tributory negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant.' Rule 8(c)
includes these in an enumeration of nineteen defenses which must be af-
firmatively pleaded. Except for the statute of frauds, all of these and
many of the other defenses which are enumerated have been held to be
"new matter" to be specially pleaded under the Montana code.' But the
'"2 Moopx 8.20, at 1673 (1948, 1960).
'Rule 8 (e) (2).
'Rule 9(b).
'47Sweeney v. Buffalo Courier Express, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 446, 447 (W.D. N.Y. 1940).
"'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3401
'In Clark v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 29 Mont. 317, 319, 74 Pac. 734 (1903),
it was held that misnomer should be specially pleaded, the court quoting froin
MAXWELL, CODE REMEDIES § 698, as follows: "All defenses which are analog-
ous to the ancient pleas in abatement-that is, all which are based upon the same
facts-are evidently new matter; they cannot be proved under the general denial,
but must be specially pleaded." The defense that another action is pending is
also "new matter" to be specially pleaded. Murray v. City of Butte, 51 Mont.
258, 262, 151 Pac. 1951 (1915).
mCLARK 597. Downs v. Nihill, 87 Mont. 145, 151, 286 Pac. 410 (1930).
"mBy error, the Montana Rule uses the adjective "affirmative" rather than the ad-
verb "affirmatively." However, the Commission Note to Proposed Rule shows
that it was intended that the Montana Rule be identical with the Federal Rule,
and the original Proposed Montana Rules of Civil Procedure prepared by the Mon-
tana Civil Rules Commission and distributed to the members of the Bar used the
adverb. It is believed that no serious question is presented as to the intent to follow
the Federal Rule.
'CLARK 613-21.
5Accord and satisfaction: Nelson v. Young, 70 Mont. 112, 224 Pac. 237 (1924). As-
sumption of risk, contributory negligence, and fellow servant: McCartan v. Park
Butte Theater Co., 103 Mont. 342, 348, 62 P.2d 338 (1936); Mosher v. Sutton's
New Theater Co., 48 Mont. 137, 146, 137 Pac. 534; Longpre v. Big Blackfoot Milling
Co., 38 Mont. 99, 104, 99 Pac. 131 (1909). Estoppel: Middle States Oil Corp. v.
Tanner-Jones Co., 73 Mont. 180, 183, 2.35 Pac. 770 (1925). Failure of considera-
tion: See Jensen v. Franklin, 135 Mont. 341, 345, 340 P.2d 832 (1959). Fraud:
Downs v. Nihill, 87 Mont. 145, 151, 286 Pac. 410 (1930). Illegality: Owens v.
Davenport, 39 Mont. 555, 557, 104 Pac. 682 (1909). Laches: Brundy v. Canby, 50
Mont. 454, 474, 148 Pac. 315 (1915). But compare Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont.
68, 80, 121 P.2d 162 (1942), holding that a court of equity may of its own motion
invoke the doctrine of laches even when not interposed as a defense, whenever it
appears that the demand made is stale and that as a result of the delay in present-
ing the claim there has been such a change in the relation of the parties (such
as death of one .of the parties to the transaction) as to prejudice the rights of the
defendant in making his defense. This seems to be an application of the principle
that nothing can call a court of equity into activity but "conscience, good faith,
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Montana Supreme Court has held that when a defendant by his answer
puts in issue the making of the contract sued upon, he may avail himself
of the statute of frauds without pleading it; although if he admits the
making of -the contract and relies upon other defenses, the statute of frauds
must be specially pleaded.' The enumeration in Rule 8(c) appears to re-
quire the statute of frauds to be affirmatively pleaded in every case.
The code provision with respect to the manner of pleading the statute
of limitations' is not superseded by the Rules, although Rule 8(c) does
include this as one of the defenses to be pleaded affirmatively. Consequent-
ly, an answer pleading the statute of limitations is sufficient if it states
generally that the action is barred by the provision of a specified section
of the code.'
However, the Rules require more detail in an answer raising the issues
of capacity and performance or occurrence of conditions precedent than
is generally required, although these defenses are to be pleaded as denials
and not affirmatively. Rule 9(a) requires that one desiring to raise an
issue as to the legal capacity of any party shall do so "by specific negative
averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly
within the pleader's knowledge." And Rule 9(c) requires that a denial
of performance or occurrence of conditions precedent "be made specifically
and with particularity."
F. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS
Rule 9 in effect is supplemental to Rules 7 and 8. Some of the pro-
visions of Rule 9 governing the pleading of special matters have already
been noted; there are others, designed to simplify procedure.
1. Conditions Precedent'
The Montana Code permitting a general allegation of the performance
of conditions precedent is limited to contracts and to conditions which a
party is required to perform.' The Montana Rule is not so restricted. It
relates to all actions and to the occurrence as well as the performance of
and reasonable diligence." Sullivan v. Portland & Kennebec Rairoad Co., 94 U.S.
806, 812 (1876), which would seem to be equally applicable under Rule 8(c).
License: Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 608, 161 Pac. 164 (1916). Payment:
Olson v. McLean, 132 Mont. 111, 115, 313, P.2d 1039 (1957). Release: Betor v.
Chevalier, 121 Mont. 337, 344, 193 P.2d 374 (1948). Waiver: Digen v. Schultz,
65 Mont. 190, 196, 210 Pac. 1057 (1922). But compare "waiver" of property in-
terest, which is admissable under a general denial in an action of conversion.
Swords v. Occident Elevator Co., 72 Mont. 189, 195, 232 Pac. 189 (1924).
'Bauer v. Monroe, 117 Mont. 306, 310, 158 P.2d 485 (1945) ; Mitchell v. Henderson,
37 Mont. 515, 520, 97 Pac. 942 (1908) ; Christiansen v. Aldrich, 30 Mont. 446, 453,
76 Pac. 1007 (1904).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3810.
"
0 In the absence of statute It has been held that specific facts must be stated in
pleading the statute of limitations. CLAnK 615. Compare Federal Form 20,
Fourth Defense: "The right of action set forth in the complaint did not accrue
within six years next before the commencement of the action." The comparable
Montana Form 16, Fourth Defense contains this language in addition to the
averment that the action is barred by the provisions of a specified section of the
Code. Thus the Montana Form appears to contain more than is essential under
the statute. Bahn v. Estate of Fritz, 92 Mont. 84, 89, 10 P.2d 1061 (1932).
WOA good article on the subject is Prashker, Pleading Performance of Conditions
Precedent, 13 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 242 (1939).
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conditions.' But as stated before, under the Montana Rule the adversary
pleader is required to deny the performance or occurrence specifically and
with particularity, whereas under the code a general denial of the allegation
of performance is sufficient.'
2. Official Document, Act, Ordinance or Statute
The first sentence of Montana Rule 9(d) is identical with the Federal
Rule, and permits pleading that an official document or act' complied
with law, without the necessity of alleging the facts showing due com-
pliance. But the Montana Rule goes beyond the Federal Rule and permits
the pleading of an ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision of the
state, or any special, local or private statute or the laws of another jurisdic-
tion, by reference to its title and the date of its passage, or by its designa-
tion in the official or recognized compilation thereof.'
3. Judgment
Under Rule 9(e) a judgment or decision of a court, tribunal, board
or officer may be pleaded without setting forth matter showing jurisdic-
tion to render it. It is sufficient to identify the court, board or officer
rendering the judgment or decision, its date, the parties to the proceedings
and in whose favor the judgment ran.' This is similar to the code pro-
vision, except that the strict requirement that it be stated that the judg-
ment or decision was "duly given or made" is omitted. '
4. Special Damage
Rule 9(g) states the well established doctrine that items of special
damage must be specifically stated. This continues the distinction be-
tween general and special damage and does not alter the settled law.'
G. COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM
Nearly twenty years ago the Supreme Court of Montana recommended
that the legislature consider consolidating the counterclaim ' and cross-
complaint' statutes of this state.' Rule 13 applies to the two types of
claims, and liberalizes the law applicable to them. Under this rule a counter-
claim is any claim against an opposing party, regardless of whether it is
connected with the claim of the opposing party or is on contract. A cross-
claim is a claim which a party has against a co-party, provided it arises
'Rule 9(c).
In MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 9.03, at 590 (1938).
'61An official act has been defined as an act done by an officer in his official capac-
ity under color of and by virtue of his office. 1A BARRON AND HoLTZoF § 305
n.69, at 234 (1960).
-"Cf. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3811 (private statutes), and §§ 93-501-2 to -501-6 (proof of
foreign law). And see Commission Note to Proposed Rule 9(d).
132 MooRi 9.06, at 1917 (1948, 1960); 1A BARRON AND HOLTzOFF § 307, at 235
(1960).
'One relying on the statutory provision must strictly comply with its terms. 30
CAlIF. L. R-v. 482, 485 (1942). Under what Is now R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3806, it has
been held that it is insufficient to say that a judgment was "rendered." Har-
mon v. Comstock Horse and Cattle Co., 9 Mont. 243, 23 Pac. 470 (1890).
"12 MooRE 9.06, at 1921 (1948, 1960).
'R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-3402, 93-3403.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3415.
'Pioneer Engineering Works, Inc. v. McConnell, 113 Mont. 392, 397, 130 P.2d 685,
132 P.2d 160 (1942).
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out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
original action or a counterclaim, or relates to any property that is the
subject matter of the original action.' The distinction between counter-
claims and cross-claims is important because of the requirement of subdi-
vision (a) with respect to compulsory counterclaims. Any claim which a
defendant has against a plaintiff which arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim must be
pleaded, if (1) it is a claim which the defendant has at the time of serving
his pleading, (2) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and (3) was not the
subject of another pending action at the time the action was commenced.
On the other hand, the pleading of cross-claims is governed by subdivision
(g) and is never compulsory.
The Rule sanctions the practice of free counterclaim by placing no
restriction on the type of counterclaim which a party is permitted to plead,
and by providing in subdivision (c) that a counterclaim need not diminish
or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party.'7° Further, restric-
tions upon the time when the counterclaim must be in existence are re-
moved." The time when the counterclaim is served is controlling, not the
time when the action is commenced. In addition, under subdivision (e) a
claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving
his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented. This
provision is in line with the purpose of Rule 13 to provide a means for
complete litigation in one action of all claims that parties may have with
respect to each other, thus avoiding multiplicity of suits.'TM
H. MOTIONS
Separate pleadings, preliminary steps and delays are avoided by the
motion practice under the Rules. Demurrers are abolished," and motions
to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, and for summary judgment are
available in their place. A motion for summary judgment, which may be
granted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, may be
made by a party defending against a claim at any time either before or
U~der R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3415, a cross-complaint may be against an opposing party
as well as against a co-party.
10See 3 MoonE 13.24, at 63 (1948). Although a counterclaim under R.C.M. 1947,
§ 93-3402, must tend to defeat or diminish the plaintiff's recovery, this is not true
of a cross-complaint under R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3415. In Pioneer Engineering Works,
Inc. v. McConnell, 113 Mont. 392, 130 P.2d 6S5, 132 P.2d 160 (1942), plaintiff
brought an action in claim and delivery for a machine sold under a conditional
sale contract upon which the defendant defaulted. A pleading, designated a coun-
terclaim, was filed for damages for breach of warranty. The court held that the
defendant's pleading would be treated as a cross-complaint and was proper. The
same result would follow under Rule 13, even in a case where the defendant's
claim does not relate to the subject matter of the action.
"The Supreme Court of Montana held that both transaction and contract counter-
claims must exist at the time the suit was brought. But a cause of action which
was a transaction counterclaim might be considered a cross-complaint and the
limitation thus avoided. Mason, Counterclaims in Montana, 3 MONT. L. REV. 33,
57 (1942) ; Pioneer Engineering Works, Inc. v. McConnell, 113 Mont. 392, 130 P.2d
685, 132 P.2d 160 (1942).
1"23 Mooai 13.32, at 86 (1948).17Rule 7 (c).
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after pleading to the claim -7' but a motion to dismiss must be made before
pleading,175 and a motion for judgment on the pleadings must be made
within such time after the pleadings are closed as not to delay the trial.'
Further, a defendant may join defenses in law with defenses in fact in a
responsive pleading, and objections which afford a ground for a motion
to dismiss may be raised in an answer. "7 Also, if a motion to dismiss or
for judgment on the pleadings is made, the court may postpone hearing
and determination thereof until trial. 8
The grounds for a motion to dismiss are those specified in subdivision
(b) of Rule 12." They are (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) in-
sufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (7) failure to join
an indispensable party. A motion to dismiss may be made on no ground
except one of these.
Special appearances required under code practice'" to contest juris-
diction over the person are not contemplated. Also, objections to improper
venue no longer require an affidavit of merits or a written demand that
the trial be had in the proper county.' Both defenses may be raised by
a motion to dismiss, or they may be asserted in the answer itself.' How-
ever, inasmuch as Rule 12 does not abolish all motions not enumerated in
the Rule,' and Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 93-2906 is not
superseded, a motion for change of place of trial, when the county desig-
nated in the complaint is not the proper county, is also proper.
There may be some doubt as to whether or not the defense of the
statute of limitations may be raised by motion to dismiss. This is especially
true if the complaint alleges a date of accrual beyond the statutory period,
because Rule 9 (f) provides that, for the purpose of testing the sufficiency
of a pleading, averments of time are material. Federal cases have held that
the defense of limitations may be raised by motion.t"  But Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947, Section 93-2719, which provides that the objection can
be taken only by answer, has not been superseded; and it would seem that
this special statute should control.'
Rule 12(b) expressly contemplates the presentation to the court of
"14Rule 56(b). A party seeking to recover upon a claim may move for summary
judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of
the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party.
Rule 56(a). Summary judgment is granted if there is no genuine issue as to any





'"Rule 12(d). Also, the court may deny a motion for summary judgment without
prejudice to its renewal at trial. Rotberg v. Dodwell & Co., Ltd., 152 F.2d 100 (2d
Cir. 1945).
'The Rule does not in terms specify a motion to dismiss, but such is the usual way
of raising the defenses enumerated.
'
mR.C.M. 1947, § 93-4801 (2) ; Missoula Belt Line Ry. Co. v. Smith, 58 Mont. 432, 193
Pac. 529 (1920).
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2905
'9ltule 12(b).
m2 MOORE 12.07, at 2243 (1948, 1960).
'2 MOORE 12.10, at 2257 (1948, 1960), citing one case contra, "believed erroneous"
by Moore.
"'See CP.AWron , STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 167 (1940) ; In re Wilson's Estate, 102
Mont. 178, 56 P.2d 733, 105 A.L.R. 367 (1936).
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matters outside the pleading, when the motion asserts the defense num-
bered (6). However, it seems that speaking motions are also available to
present the defenses specified by the other six grounds for motion to dis-
miss." As a matter of fact, the extraneous material which may be presented
when the ground of the motion is failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted is more limited than it is when the motion is made on
one of the other grounds. This results from the fact that only defense
numbered (6) is integrated with the motion for summary judgment, and
the Montana Rule on summary judgment 1' departs from the Federal Rule
by providing that on such a motion "Affidavits shall not be considered for
any purpose." Depositions, answers to interrogatories,' and admissions
on file, in addition to the pleadings, may be considered on a motion for
summary judgment; and these are the only materials which may be con-
sidered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted because subdivision (c) of Rule 12 provides that when
such a motion is made and "matters outside the pleadings are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such motion by Rule 56." But defenses (1) through (5), and (7) in
Rule 12(b) are not thus integrated with the motion for summary judg-
ment.' Consequently, when the motion to dismiss is on one of the grounds
other than (6), affidavits may be considered by the court in its discretion.
This conclusion is buttressed by Rule 43(e), which provides that "Except
as otherwise provided in Rule 56, when a motion is based on facts not
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented
by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be
heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions."
Affidavits may not be considered on motions for judgment on the plead-
ings, because such motions are integrated with Rule 56 in similar manner
as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
This departure from the Federal Rules evidences distrust of affidavits.
It probably does not seriously curtail the use of speaking motions, since
it would seem that, if a reliable affidavit can be obtained, with some ad-
ditional effort a deposition may be taken.'
'12 MOORE 12.09, at 2256 (1948, 1960).
''Rule 56(c).
'Rule 56 (c) does not refer to interrogatories as one of the things which may be con-
sidered, but Rule 26(d) provides that depositions may be used upon the hearing of
a motion, and Rule 33 provides that answers to interrogatories may be used to the
same extent as provided in Rule 26(d) for the use of depositions. See 4 MOORE
33.29 (1950).
'The reason is that defenses (1) through (5), and (7) do not raise matters in bar,
and under Rule 56 on summary judgment only matters on the merits can be raised
and if a judgment Is rendered thereunder it Is one in bar. 2 MOORE 12.09, at
2257 (1948, 1960).
'Under Rule 12(b) and (c) it is left to the discretion of the trial court whether or
not to receive even depositions on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted or a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Under
Rule 56 the court has nb such discretion on a motion for summary judgment. 2
MOORE 12.09, at 2256 (1948, 1960). Of course, no extraneous matter should be
used for the purpose of deciding an issue of fact; such matter should only be used
for the purpose of discovering whether there is an issue of fact. Farrall v. District
of Columbia Amateur Athletic Union, 153 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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Other motions provided for by Rule 12 are for a more definite state-
ment and to strike. A motion for a more definite statement is proper only
when the moving party is required or permitted to file a responsive plead-
ing, and when the pleading to which the motion is directed is so vague or
ambiguous that the moving party cannot reasonably be required to frame
a responsive pleading.' A motion to strike is proper to reach any re-
dundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. This is a reflec-
tion of the inherent power of the court to prune down pleadings."*  But
also, the motion to strike is a method of objecting to an insufficient defense,
it being expressly provided in Rule 12(f) that on such a motion "the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense."
Rule 12 does not 1)ermit successive motions, such as is possible under
('ode practice. Under subdivision (g), a party who makes a motion under
Rule 12 may join with it other motions provided for in that Rule and then
available to him." There is no waiver by including all defenses in one
motion. But if a party makes a motion under Rule 12 and does not in-
clude all defenses then available to him which the Rule permits, subject
to the exceptions set forth in subdivision (h), he may not thereafter make
a motion based on such omitted defenses or objections, ' nor raise them by
answer or reply.' The non-waivable exceptions of subdivision (h) are
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, failure to join
an indispensable party, failure to state a defense to a claim, and lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter. These defenses may be made by plead-
ing, by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at trial, and the defense
of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be raised at any time by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise.
Since the requirement of consolidation applies only to defenses antt
objections permitted to be raised by Rule 12, motions such as for security
for costs, or for stay, or for an extension of time to answer, need not be
consolidated with motions under Rule 12, although consolidation is not im-
proper.
J. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
1. Amendments
Rule 15 with respect to amendments is similar to the superseded
statutes.' However, under the code practice the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana said that an amended complaint must not state a new and distinct
"cause of action" from that contained in the original complaint.' Such a
restriction upon amendment becomes crucial when the statutory period of
limitations has run between the date of the filing of the original com-
plaint and the amendment. Although a liberal construction of "cause of
action" was adopted by the court, permitting an amendment to state a
IVRule 12 (e).
-2 Moom 12.21, at 2312 (1948, 1960).
"mThis qualification on the requirement for consolidation would permit a motion for
a more definite statement followed by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on the basis of facts disclosed in the more definite statement. 2 MOORE
12.22, at 2324 (1948, 1960).
'"Rule 12(g).
'Rule 12(h).
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-2303, -3304, -3818, -3901 to -3905, -3909.
"'Cooke v. Meyers, 86 Mont. 423, 283 Pac. 1114 (1930).
[Vol. 23,
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"good cause of action,"' nevertheless such a restriction necessarily intro-
duces the confusion and uncertainty which surrounds the phrase "cause of
action. "' Under the new procedure there is no rule preventing an amend-
ment because it changes the "cause of action" or "claim"; but granting
permission to amend is within the discretion of the court, except for amend-
ment as a matter of right before responsive pleading, or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted, within 20 days after the pleading sought to be amend-
cd is served."' More particularly, Rule 15 (c) provides as follows: "When-
ever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth
in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the
original pleading." The question is whether the original pleading gives
fair notice of the general fact situation out of which the claim or defense
arose. If so, the amendment will relate back even though the statute of
limitations has run in the interim. There is no objection to merely making
more specific what has already been averred generally or to changing the
legal theory of the action.'
The time for pleading in response to an amended pleading is somewhat
different from that under code practice. Under code practice one has 20
(lays to plead to an amended pleading ; under Rule 15(a) he has the time
remaining for a response to the original pleading or 10 days after service
of the amended pleading, whichever may be longer, unless the court orders
otherwise.
2. Supplements
Rule 15(d) permits supplemental pleadings, within the discretion of
the court, relating to transactions, occurrences or events happening after
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. This is similar to the
code provision.' The Rule does not permit a supplemental pleading of
facts merely because the pleader was ignorant of them at the date of the
original pleading, as is permitted in some states.'
Montana Rule 15(d) has added to the Federal Rule a clause recom-
mended in 1955 by the Federal Advisory Committee, which permits a sup-
plemental pleading, whether or not the original pleading is defective in
its statement of a claim for relief or defense. This would seem to be the
correct position, even without this added clause. But some federal cases
have held that if parties are before the court on a defective complaint, it
is necessary to dismiss their action and require the commencement of a
new action, even though the events occurring after the commencement of
the original action give a right to judicial relief.' Under the Montana
Rule it is clear that a supplemental complaint will be tested on its own
merits."
10Clark v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 38 Mont. 177, 185, 99 Pac. 298 (1909).
"Supra, pages 19-21.
°Rule 15 (a).
213 MOORE 15.15, at 852 (1948).
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3904.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3818.
'CLARK 742.
2"1A BARRON AND HOLrzor" § 455, at 820 (1960). There seems to be no more justi-
fication for this when dealing with a supplemental pleading than when dealing
with an amendment.
"Federal Advisory Committee, Final Report, October, 1955.
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V. PARTIES AND CLAIMS
The foundation code requirement' that every action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest is continued.' However, the
Rules with respect to joinder of parties have been simplified and extended
so far as consistent with trial convenience, and these rules control the joinder
of claims.'
A. JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND REMEDIES
1. Claims
Joinder of claims is treated by the Rules as a trial and not a pleading
problem."m The arbitrary code classification "' of causes of action which
may be joined is abandoned, and the learning with respect to the eight
code classes and when they may be said to affect all of the parties to the
action may be forgotten. Under Rule 18(a) if there is but one plaintiff
and one defendant, there is no limit upon permissive joinder of claims,
legal or equitable or both. If there are multiple parties, the requirements
with respect to joinder of parties serve as the only limitations upon joinder
of claims.'
2. Remedies
Rule 18 (b) provides that whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable
only after another claim has been prosecuted to conclusion, the two claims
may be joined. This permits a claim to adjudicate the plaintiff's status
as a stockholder to be joined with a claim to enforce a secondary right on
behalf of the corporation," and an action against a surety on a bond of a
deceased administrator may be maintained before an accounting and de-
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2801.
mRule 17(a).
mRules 19, 20, 21.
2'03 MOORE 18.05, at 1813 (1948).
m R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3203.
mThere has been some disagreement as to the result when there are multiple claims
and parties. Rule 20, dealing with joinder of parties, refers to the assertion of a
right to relief arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transac-
tions or occurrences, and to the existence of a question of fact or law common "to
all of them." (Emphasis supplied). The position has been taken that these re-
quirements relate to the claims. Thus in Federal Housing Administrator v. Chris-
tianson, 6 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1939), a plaintiff held two promissary notes,
both of which had been made and endorsed to him the same day. Three persons
whom he joined as defendants were liable to him on one of the notes. Two of the
same people were liable on the other note. It was held that there was a misjoinder
under Federal Rules 18 and 20, because there was no common question of fact or
law as to the two claims. Professor Moore agrees that this is a proper position.
3 MoonE 18.04, at 1812 (1948). But Professor Wright disagrees, taking the posi-
tion that it is not necessary that there be a question common to both claims. His
position is that the requirement of a common question relates only to the parties,
and that much the same interpretation should be given to the requirement of the
same transaction or occurrence. Thus, he contends that the Christianson case was
wrong, since "plainly whatever questions are involved in the note on which all
three of the Christianson defendants were sued are common to them all," and
"there was a right to relief asserted against all of' the defendants growing out
of the first note." Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 MINN. L. Rnv. 580, 604-11 (1952).
Rule 18 does not extend the jurisdiction or venue of the district courts. Rule 82.
Consequently, a motion under Rule 12(b) to dismiss a claim as to which the court
has no jurisdiction, or as to which the venue is improper, should be sustained, al-
though so far as the subject matter of the claim is concerned it is properly joined
with another claim as to which the court has jurisdiction and as to which the
venue is proper.
mRichardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939).
[Vol. 23,
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termination of the amount for which the principal is liable.1' The Rule
covers specifically the joinder of a claim for money and a claim to set aside
a fraudulent transfer, without first having obtained a judgment establish-
ing the claim for money.'
Rule 18(b) is intended to cover only matters of procedure, and does
not permit the joinder of the defendant's liability or indemnity insurer
contrary to a substantive rule of law.' To avoid any confusion, the fol-
lowing sentence was added to the Montana Rule: "This rule shall not be
applied in tort cases so as to permit the joinder of a liability or indemnity
insurance carrier, unless such carrier is by law or contract directly liable
to the person injured or damaged."
3. Power to Separate; Effect of Misjoinder
To avoid inconvenience of trial and prejudice which may result from
such freedom of joinder, the Rules provide for broad discretion in the court
to order the separate trial of any claim or separate issue. 1' And such an
order, rather than dismissal, is the normal way of handling the rare situa-
tion where there is a misjoinder of claims, as when multiple parties join
in a claim as to which there is no common question of law or fact."
B. NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES
In substance Rule 19 continues the code requirement that parties
"united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants."' How-
ever, the Rule requires the distinction between indispensable and necessary
parties which, originating in equity, has been made in federal courts for
over a century.' Failure to join an indispensable party is ground for a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), and under 12(h) the defense is not
waived by failure to present it by such motion or by responsive pleading
but may be made by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial
on the merits. On the other hand, the omission of a necessary party is
handled quite differently. Under Rule 19(c) the name of any necessary
party who is not joined must be set forth by the pleader and the reason for
the omission given. Under Rule 19(b) the omission is not ground for a
motion to dismiss but only for an order of the court summoning the omitted
person to appear, and the court in its discretion may proceed without such
a person if jurisdiction over him cannot be acquired without his consent
or voluntary appearance.
Consequently, the term "necessary party" is a misnomer, and it may
clarify thinking to refer to such a party as "conditionally necessary."
Such parties are described in Rule 19(b) as persons "who ought to be
parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties."
But an indispensable- party is one whose interest would necessarily be af-
fected by a judgment in the case. In State of Washington v. United
States,' Judge Haney of the Ninth Circuit said:
2
'Utesch v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 27 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Iowa 1939).
2'3 MooRE 18.08, at 1826 (1948).
'2 BARRON AND HoLTzoFF § 505, at 50-51 (1950). 3 MOORE 18.08, at 1828 (1948).
'Rules 21 and 42(b).
'83 MooRE 18.05, at 1813 (1948).
2'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2821.
'Perhaps the leading case is Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 15 L. Ed. 158 (1855).
.. This is a New York classification. CLARK 362.
87 F.2d 421, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1936).
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There are many adjudicated cases in which expressions are
made with respect to the tests used to determine whether an absent
party is a necessary party. From these authorities it appears that
the absent party must be interested in the controversy. After first
determining that such a party is interested in the controversy, the
court must make a determination of the following questions applied
to the particular case: (1) Is the interest of the absent party
distinct and severable? (2) In the absence of such party, can the
court render justice between the parties before it? (3) Will the
decree made, in the absence of such party have no injurious effect
on the interest of such absent party? (4) Will the final determina-
tion, in the absence of such party, be consistent with equity and
good conscience?
If, after the court determines that an absent party is inter-
ested in the controversy, it finds that all of the four questions out-
lined above are answered in the affirmative with respect to the ab-
sent party's interest, then such absent party is a necessary party.
However, if any one of the four questions is answered in the nega-
tive, then the absent party is indispensable.
It has been said that this merely gives an illusion of certainty, since
one returns to concepts of equity and good conscience, which are hardly
terms of art. But the character of parties in many situations appears to
be settled. A good illustration of an indispensable paity is presented by
a Wisconsin case arising under the code provision requiring joinder of
parties united in interest.' The plaintiffs alleged that their land was
overflowed by reason of a dam maintained by the defendant city, and
prayed that it be abated. The defendant answered that streets had been
graded up to the level of a lake caused by the dam and that the abutting
property owners should be brought in. The court sustained the position
of the defendant, saying: ". . . [I]f a person is so affected by the decree
that his property interests are impaired or destroyed by its enforcement,
he is an indispensable party to the litigation, and it cannot proceed with-
out his presence, unless the case is brought within the rule of one repre-
senting a class."'
Under the above principles, joint obligees are indispensable parties,
but joint obligors are only necessary, even in jurisdictions where joint ob-
ligations have not been made joint and several.' In Montana joint obliga-
tions are made joint and several ;' consequently, joint obligors are not even
necessary parties.' And in a tort action, joint tortfeasors are neither in-
dispensable nor necessary, because their liability is both joint and several. '
If the purpose of the suit is the disposition of a fund or an estate to which
there are several claimants, generally all of the claimants are indispensa-
ble.' In actions involving real or personal property, the question is
whether the relief sought goes beyond the protection of the interest of the
parties. Thus, as is stated in Moore's Federal Practice:
' Castle v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 346, 89 N.W. 156 (1902).
M'Id., 89 N.W. at 159. Rule 19(a) also makes its provisions subject to those of Rule
23 which deals with class actions.
'3 MOORE 19.11, at 2169-70 (1948).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 58-202.
'They would be proper parties under Rule 20.
'3 MooRE 19.07, at 2153 (1948).
'3 MOORE 119.08 (1948).
[Vol. 23,
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[O]ne tenant in common may sue in ejectment in order to recover
his aliquot portion of the land without joining the other tenants in
common. On the other hand when tenants in common seek to can-
cel or rescind a lease, all of them must be before the court because
the contract involved is an entire and indivisible one; the right of
any one tenant is not distinct and the relief sought is interwoven
with the rights of the other tenants.m
C. PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES
Rule 20 removes code restrictions upon permissive joinder of parties.
The code attempted to state the equity rule by providing that all persons
having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded may join as plaintiffs.' But equity courts had taken the posi-
tion that the rule was largely in the discretion of the court, and that the
guiding purpose was to prevent multiplicity of suits by allowing joinder
whenever the issues could conveniently be settled together.m  Courts under
the codes, particularly in actions at law, tend to disregard the meaning of
the rule in equity and construe the statute strictly as requiring that all
plaintiffs be interested not only in the subject of the action but also in the
relief sought.' Thus, joinder is not allowed under the code in a suit for
damages when defendant's single act injures lands of which the plaintiffs
each own separate parcels or chattels owned separately by the plaintiffs.
If injunction is sought against a common injury or nuisance, however, the
courts allow joinder in such situations. But when contractees under separ-
ate but similar contracts attempt to join in a suit against an obligor for a
money judgment, code cases hold that there is a misjoinder. '
Much the same situation exists under code practice with respect to per-
missive joinder of defendants. The provision permitting joinder of any
person who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the
plaintiff' might seem sufficiently broad to permit the complete settlement
of a transaction in a single suit. But frequently it does not work out that
way. Many courts have given a limited construction to the term con-
troversy, and have imposed much the same limits upon joinder of defend-
ants as upon joinder of plaintiffs. The result is that the arbitrary common
law distinction between joint and several interests is continued. Thus,
when a plaintiff sues a servant who is the wrongdoer, and the master who
is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a number of code cases
hold that there is a misjoinder.' A leading case on strict construction of
causes and parties is Ader v. Blau,' decided by the Court of Appeals of
New York. An administrator sued for the death of a child, joining the
owner of a fence and a physician. The plaintiff alleged in one cause of
action that the death was caused by the negligence of the defendant property
owner in maintaining the fence on which the child was injured; in another
cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the death was caused by the negli-
"°3 MooRE 19.09, at 2158-59 (1948).




t R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2812.
MCLARK 382-83.
20M. 385.
241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925).
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gence of the defendant physician who treated the child for the injury re-
ceived on the fence. The court held that there was a misjoinder of causes
and parties, although the statute on joinder of parties provided for joinder
in the alternative.
Such holdings do not promote the convenience of either the parties or
the courts. Two suits are required although much of the evidence will be
the same. The result is unnecessary costs and delay and the risk of incon-
sistent jury verdicts.
Actually, as is the case with joinder of causes, the problem of joinder
of parties is not a pleading problem but a trial problem. Rule 20 so treats
it. The provisions for joinder of plaintiffs and defendants are similar,
and impose two limitations: (1) the right to relief must be in respect of
or arise out of "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences," and (2) there must be a "question of law or fact common
to all of them." And misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal.'
Subdivision (b) of Rule 20 gives the court needed discretion in handling
the trial problem by providing that it "may make such orders as will pre-
vent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the
inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no
claim against him, and may order separate trials or make other orders to
prevent delay or prejudice." Rule 21, which must be read in connection
with Rule 20, permits the court to drop parties on motion or of its own
initiative. The claims remain separate and distinct by reason of the pro-
vision of Rule 20(a) that judgment may be gvien for or against one or
more of the parties according to their respective rights or liabilities.
The ultimate effect is to place the matter of joinder of parties in the
discretion of the court as a matter of trial convenience whenever there is
any common question of fact or law arising upon the facts of the particular
case. A good illustration of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff is
presented by automobile negligence cases. All persons suffering personal
injuries or property damage in the same collision have been permitted to
join as plaintiffs in one action.' Again, the same New York court that
decided Ader v. Blau, a year earlier in Akely v. Kinnicutt," under statutory
language similar to that of Rule 20, permitted 193 persons who were de-
frauded by a stock prospectus issued by the defendant to join in their re-
covery of several damages. As to defendants, no pleading problem is
presented by joinder of defendants against whom liability is asserted sev-
erally. In fact, liability may even be asserted against the defendants in
the alternative, permitting a plaintiff who is in doubt as to which of two
defendants is liable to submit the entire controversy to the court for de-
termination.'
D. INTERPLEADER
Subdivision (a) of Rule 22 authorizes interpleader as the converse of
alternative joinder authorized by subdivision (a) of Rule 20, materially
liberalizing code practice. Not only does Rule 20 permit joinder of de-
fendants in the alternative; it also permits the joinder of two or more
mRule 21.
"02 BARRON AND HOLTOFF § 532, at 104 (1950).
"238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682 (1924).
'Gavit, The New Federal Rules and State Procedure, 25 A.B.A.J. 367, 374 (1939).
[Vol. 23,
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persons as plaintiffs when they are in doubt as to which one possesses the
right. Conversely, Rule 22(a) authorizes a plaintiff to join as defendants
two or more persons having claims against him.
The code removed some of the technical restrictions upon equitable
interpleader, by authorizing relief against conflicting claimants "although
their titles or claims have not a common origin, or are not identical, but
are adverse to and independent of one another."' However, the equitable
requirements that the person asking the relief must not have or claim any
interest in the subject matter, and must have incurred no independent lia-
bility to either of the claimants, ' remained under the code. As the Supreme
Court of Montana said in Central Montana Stockyards v. Fraser,' the plain-
tiff in an interpleader action under the code must maintain "the delicate
poise and balance of a disinterested stakeholder." The result was that
under the code, "a bailee or agent cannot maintain an interpleader suit
against the bailor or the principal and a third person who asserts an inde-
pendent, antagonistic, and paramount title to the fund."' Rule 22(a)
removes this restriction, and expressly provides that it is not a ground
for objection that a plaintiff in an interpleader action "avers that he is
not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants."
Subdivision (b) of Montana Rule 22 adds to the Federal Rule the
code provision " for substitution by a defendant of another in his place.
This is a more limited procedure, available to a defendant who wishes to
obtain an order discharging him from liability without awaiting final judg-
ment in the case. It is available only in actions upon a contract or for
specific real or personal property, and only when the defendant is in the
position of a mere stakeholder.' Application for an order of substitution
must be made before answer, and the granting of the order is within the
discretion of the court. An affidavit of no collusion is required, and the
defendant must place the money or property in dispute in the custody of
the court.
It is doubtful whether the procedure authorized by subdivision (b)
of Rule 22 will be availed of frequently, since subdivision (a) extends its
unrestricted provisions to a defendant who is exposed to multiple liability.
Such a defendant may obtain interpleader by way of cross-claim or counter-
claim pursuant to the practice authorized by Rule 13, and may implead
third parties as provided in Rule 14.
E. THIRD PARTY PRACTICE
Devices for bringing in a person liable over to an original defendant
are provided by the code. Provision is made for bringing in such a person
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2825. The equitable remedy of interpleader before the codes
required, inter alia, that the same thing, debt, or duty be claimed by the parties
against whom the relief was demanded; and that all their adverse titles be depend-
ent upon or derived from a common source. CLARK 428, citing 4 POMEmoY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1320 (5th ed. 1941).
.'CLARK 428.
'133 Mont. 168, 194, 320 P.2d 981, 994 (1957).
2404 PoMERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1327 (5th ed. 1941). Wight v. Ferrell, 188
Ga. 200, 3 S.E.2d 736 (1939).
MR.O.M. 1947, § 93-2825.
mCentral Montana Stockyards v. Fraser, 133 Mont. 168, 320 P.2d 981 (1957) ; Union
Bank & Trust Co. v. State Bank of Townsend, 103 Mont. 260, 62 P.2d 677 (1936).
The affidavit of no collusion must state that the person sought to be substituted
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by order of court when "a complete determination of the controversy can-
not be had without" his presence." Also the code provides that a defend-
ant may, at the time of filing his answer, or subsequently by permission
of court, file a cross-complaint against persons not originally parties and
ask relief necessary or required to permit full determination of all rights
''relating to or dependent upon the contract, transaction, or subject-matter,
or affecting the property to which the action relates."'
Rule 14 extends these provisions in accordance with the general pur-
pose "to avoid two actions which should be tried together to save time and
cost of a reduplication of evidence, to obtain consistent results from identical
or similar evidence, and to do away with the serious handicap to defendant
of a time difference between a judgment against him, and a judgment in
his favor against the third-party defendant.'"'" The Rule permits a de-
fendant at any time after commencement of the action by summons and
complaint to bring in a person "who is or may be liable" to him.' The
Montana Rule, following the 1955 proposal of the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee, departs from the requirement of the Federal Rule that the third-
party plaintiff move the court for leave to file his complaint. Such a com-
plaint may be filed as a matter of right, regardless of when filed, subject
to subsequent motion for severance, separate trial, or dismissal of the third-
party claim. By using the term "claim" the Rule avoids limitations re-
sulting from narrow constructions of terms such as "controversy," "trans-
action," and "subject matter." Thus, in Fruit Growers Co-op. v. Califor-
,nia Pie & Bakirg Co., Inc.,' a seller of cherries sued the buyer for the con-
tract price. The buyer had refused to pay because the fruit had arrived in
bad condition, and was permitted to implead the railroads over which the
fruit was shipped. The court was not concerned with the fact that the
action was in contract and the third-party complaint was in tort. Neither
was it concerned with the fact that the third-party defendants were not
indemnitors. Rather it was influenced by the fact that the defendant was
seeking to transfer the liability being asserted against it, and that consider-
able time would be wasted were two separate actions necessary.
The third-party practice is, of course, procedural; it does not change
the substantive law. Impleader is proper when liability to the third-party
plaintiff is by way of indemnity, subrogation, contribution, or express or
implied warranty, and altough it is contingent and cannot be established
until the original defendant has been held liable.' But the liability of the
third-party defendant must exist as a matter of substantive law. Thus,
the right of a defendant to implead a joint tortfeasor may depend upon
whether there is a substantive right of contribution between joint tort-
feasors. The general rule in this country, that joint tortfeasors in pari
delicto have no right to contribution, has been departed from by a few
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2828.
2 R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3415.
2R3 MooRz 14.04, at 412 (1948).
'A defendant who uses this device is called a third-party plaintiff, and the i-
pleaded party is called a third-party defendant. A plaintiff confronted with a
counterclaim is in the position of a defendant with respect to the counterclaim and
may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which would entitle
an original defendant to do so. Rule 14(b).
-2 F.R.D. 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
'1A BARRON AND HOLTZOFF § 426, at 664-73 (1960).
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American courts and by the legislatures of several states." But until this
general rule is abrogated, Rule 14 affords no right to implead a joint tort-
feasor.'
A somewhat different question is presented when a defendant in a
negligence case seeks to implead his insurer. The decided weight of author-
ity recognizes that impleader is proper. But the problem arises only in that
limited class of case where the insurer has disclaimed liability and has re-
fused to defend on behalf of the insured.' In such a case, even where the
insurance policy contains a "no action" clause or a provision that nothing
contained in the policy shall give any person any right to join the insurer
as a co-defendant in any action against the insured to determine the in-
sured's liability, the rule allowing impleader of one who "may be" liable
to the defendant controls.'
F. INTERVENTION
Intervention is a device by which non-parties may present claims or
defenses in pending actions, counterbalancing devices for joinder of par-
ties.'  Montana has had the broader type of intervention statute found
in code states ;' but, because of two limitations, it has not adequately ac-
complished its purpose of preventing multiplicity of suits. Under this
statute a petition for intervention must be filed before trial; also the inter-
venor must have an interest in the matter in litigation. The courts very
generally have required such an interest that the intervenor will gain or
lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. For ex-
ample, in an action for personal injuries, the defendant's insurer could not
intervene, since coverage of the insurance policy was not involved in the
action, although the insurer claimed that the plaintiff and defendant were
conspiring to defraud it.'
Under Rule 24 intervention must be "timely," but there is no require-
ment that it be before trial. And, in addition to three categories for in-
tervention of right, there is provision for intervention in the discretion of
the court when the applicant's claim or defense and the main action have
a question of law or fact in common. The first category for intervention
of right is "when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene."
The right to intervene under the second and third categories is similar to the
right to intervene under a statute requiring an interest in the matter in
'No Montana ease or statute has been found which changes the general rule. Under
R.C.M. 1947, § 58-203, a right of contribution exists when an obligor satisfies more
than his share of the claim. (See also R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5843 with respect to satis-
faction of a writ of execution issued on a judgment in an action on a joint con-
tract.) However, if under substantive law a right of contribution does not arise
until a judgment debtor claiming contribution has paid more than his proportionate
share of a money judgment, it is not a proper case for impleader. Lo Cicero v.
Continental Baking Co., 13 F.R.D. 243 (E.D., N.Y. 1952).
-rt3 MOORE T 14.03, at 410 and 14.11, at 427-28 (1948). A case of optional joinder by
the plaintiff cannot be converted into a case by which the defendant can compel the
plaintiff to proceed against someone other than the one he has chosen to sue.7Any attempt by an insured to implead the insurer who has not disclaimed liability
would be a breach of the "cooperation" clause of the policy of insurance.
_1A BARRON AND HOLTzOFF § 426.2 (1960). The leading case Is Jordan v. Stephens,
7 F.R.D. 140, 141 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
"4 MOORE 24.02, at 6 (1960).
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2826; CLARK 421.
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litigation, except for the greater liberality as to the time for intervention.
T'hus, in Wolpe v. Poretskyr an action was brought against a zoning com-
mission to enjoin it from enforcing a zoning order. Adjoining property
owners, who would be bound by a judgment setting aside the zoning order,
were permitted to intervene after judgment. Inadequacy of representation,
which is required when the ground for intervention is that the applicant's
interest is or may be bound by the judgment, was indicated by failure of
the zoning commission to take an appeal. In determining whether the ap-
plication for intervention was "timely," the court considered the nature
of the rights involved as well as the time element. Of course, the inter-
venors may not have had reason to think that their interests would not be
properly protected by the zoning commission until it decided not to appeal.
In cases of permissive intervention it is not necessary that the inter-
venor have a direct interest in the matter in litigation, but the court, in ex-
ercising its discretion whether to grant the motion to intervene, must con-
sider whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties. The court may refuse intervention
if the intervenor merely underlines issues already raised by the primary
parties, accumulating proofs and arguments without assisting the court.'
A motion to intervene is required, even in cases of intervention of right,
stating the grounds for intervention. This motion and a pleading setting
forth a well-pleaded claim or defense for which intervention is sought must
be served on all parties affected.
The public interest is protected by two provisions. Subdivision (c)
of Rule 24 provides that the court shall notify the Attorney General when
the constitutionality of legislation affecting the public interest is drawn in
question in any action to which neither the state nor any agency or officer
is a party, and that "the Attorney General may within 20 days thereafter
intervene .. . on behalf of the state." The quoted clause is substituted
for a reference in the Federal Rules to a statute of the United States,' and
contemplates intervention of right. In cases in which no such constitutional
issue is involved, provision for permissive official intervention is made by
subdivision (b). On timely application, a state agency or officer may in-
tervene, within the discretion of the court, in an action in which a party
relies upon a statute or executive order administered by the officer or
agency or upon a regulation or agreement issued or made pursuant to the
statute or exeutive order.
G. CLASS ACTIONS
The code provisions for representative suits' is superseded by the
more precise provisions of Rule 23. Subdivision (a) divides class actions
into three categories which have been called "true," "hybrid," and "spuri-
ous. ' In the situations covered by these categories, an action may be
maintained by or against one or more persons on behalf of a class, provided
(1) the persons constituting the class are so numerous as to make it im-
practicable to bring them all before the court, and (2) the named parties
-144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
"Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944).T28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1958).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2821.103 Moon 23.08-2310 (1948).
[Vol. 23,
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are such as will fairly insure adequate representation. The true class
action, where the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is joint, or common, or secondary, is illustrated by suits by or
against representatives of an unincorporated association,' which are to be
distinguished from suits under the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, sec-
tion 93-2827, which permits suits against, but not by, an unincorporated as-
sociation in its common name. The hybrid class action, where the char-
acter of the right is several and claims affecting specific property are
presented, is comparatively uncommon but has been said to be especially
suited for the relief of bondholders by way of protecting the fund estab-
lished for redemption of such bonds.' The spurious class action, where
the character of the right is several and a common question of law or fact
is presented and a common relief is sought, expands the representative suit
and is a modern development as a counterpart of the expanded Rule for
permissive joinder of parties. ' Illustrations are actions in behalf of prop-
erty owners damaged by fire negligently started by a railroad," ° in behalf
of purchasers or holders of securities defrauded by a common course of
dealing on the part of the defendants,' and by an insurer for a declara-
tory judgment to determine liability to a large number of beneficiaries
under a fire insurance policy."
The Rule does not attempt to deal with the effect of judgments on
persons who are not parties, due process requirements of notice and op-
portunity to be heard being involved. The prevailing view found in fed-
eral cases makes the effect of judgments depend upon the type of action.
In a true class action the judgment is conclusive on the absent members of
the class represented. In a hybrid class action it is conclusive on the ab-
sent members insofar as the proceeding operates in rem, but insofar as the
proceeding is in personam the judgment does not bind those who are not
parties. In a spurious class action the judgment is conclusive only as to
those actually before the court. 8
With the effect of the judgment thus limited, the spurious class action
provided for by the Federal Rule is a device to expand federal jurisdiction
by allowing parties to intervene who would otherwise be barred by require-
ments of diversity of citizenship," but would seem to have little, if any,
utility in state practice. However, the Montana Rule 23 incorporates as
subdivisions (d) a proposal of the Federal Advisory Committee made in its
May 1954, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, which opens the
way to attach conclusive effect to judgments in such actions and thus ac-
complish the fundamental purpose to avoid multiplicity of suits. The Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Note explains that the first two sentences of the
''3 MooE 23.08, at 3435 (1948).
'682 BARRON AND HOLTZOFT § 562, at 148 (1950).
'3 MooP 23.10 (1948).27 See Shipley v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa.
1947).
'Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 559 (1941).
"Pacific Fire Ins. Co: v. Rdiner, 45 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1942).
2733 MOORE 23.11, at 3465 (1948).
v"Since under Rule 24 intervention of right depends upon judicial determination that
parties seeking to intervene will or may be bound by the judgment, under cases
making the effect of the judgment depend upon the type of action, intervention
would not be of right in a spurious class suit.
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subdivision give the court broad power to impose any terms necessary to
insure adequate protection to absentees, including, but not limited to, the
giving of notice. The notice, which the court may order given, may be "of
the pendency of the action, or a proposed settlement, of entry of judgment
or of any other proceeding in the action, including notice to come in and
present claims and defenses." The concluding sentence of the subdivision
allows the court, if there is inadequate representation notwithstanding such
orders, to eliminate all class-representation aspects from an action.
Professor Moore has criticized the addition as it appears in the Mon-
tana Rule on the ground that it gives the court power to compel non-
parties to come in and present claims and defenses," and the Federal Ad-
visory Committee, in its 1955 Report, revised its proposal so that it would
merely permit the court to give notice to the absent parties that they may
come in and present claims and defenses if they so desire. Perhaps such
a notice to absentees would permit conclusive effect to be given to judg-
ments on issues of law or fact common to the group. " If so, it would not
seem that the revision materially ameliorates the notice; if not, it would not
appear to add materially to the utility of spurious class actions. Of course,
it is to be assumed that a court will not unwarrantably interfere with the
rights of nonparties by compelling appearance of persons who have their
own suits pending and who object for good cause to being brought into
the class action.
Subdivision (c) of Rule 23 affords protection to represented parties
by providing that a class action cannot be dismissed or compromised with-
out the approval of the court. Further, in a true class action, notice of a
proposed dismissal or compromise must be given to the members of the
class in such manner as the court directs."7 This is necessary because the
right or duty involved partially belongs to or runs against all members of
the class."8 In hybrid and spurious class actions, notice need be given only
if the court requires it.
Subdivision (b) of Rule 23 covers derivative actions by a shareholder
to enforce the association's cause of action.' The complaint must set forth
with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing
directors or trustees and the shareholders the action desired, and the rea-
sons for failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making the
effort. However, the Montana Rule does not require, as does the Federal
Rule, that the complaint be under oath and contain averments that the
plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction or that his share
thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law. Such a requirement is
unnecessary in a state court which does not have the same jurisdictional
problems as the federal court.'
3 MooRE 23.01 (1948, Supp. 1960, at 219).
2 7But see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
'This requirement of notice applies only to voluntary dismissals by a plaintiff and
is not a condition precedent to dismissal by the court after hearing on the merits.
3 MOORE 23.24, at 3550 (1948).
283 MOORE 23.24, at 3549 (1948).
"The subdivision is limited to suits which are derivative in nature, and is not ap-
plicable to suits to enforce primary rights, as distingushed from secondary rights.
3 Moom 23.16 (1948). Of course, subdivision (a) may be applicable to stock-
holders' suits to enforce primary rights.
°3 MooRE 23.15, at 3493 (1948).
[Vol. 23,
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H. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
Rule 25 provides for substitution of parties on motion in case of death,
incompetency, transfer of interest, and separation from public office. The
Federal Rule is a wholly procedural rule, merely providing the method
by which parties may be substituted in actions pending in district courts.
it does not attempt to affect substantive rights by stating what actions shall
survive." This is not entirely true of the Montana Rule. The right of a
parent or guardian to bring an action for damages for the wrongful death
of his child or ward,' and the right to bring an action for the benefit of
heirs for the wrongful death of an adult,' arc unaffected by the Montana
Rule. But section 93-2824 of the Revised Codes of Montana of 1947, the
general survival statute, has been repealed; and subdivision (a) (3) of
the Montana Rule provides that after verdict is rendered or an order for
judgment is made, an action shall not abate by death of any party and sub-
stitution shall be allowed as in other cases. Inasmuch as the right to sue
for damages for personal torts and wrongful death does not survive at
common law, ' the result is a material change in substantive rights in this
type of action.'
Subdivision (a) (1) of the Federal Rule 25 requires that any order of
substitution in case of death of a party shall be made within two years
after the death. The Federal Advisory Committee in its Final Reports of
1.946 and 1955 proposed an amendment to remove the arbitrary two year
limitation and provide instead for substitution within a reasonable time.
The Montana Rule adopts this proposal. Again, subdivision (d) of the Fed-
eral Rule, providing for the substitution of a successor in office, in case a
public officer dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, at the time
of the adoption of the Montana Rules required that the substitution by
made within six months after the successor takes office. The Federal Ad-
visory Committee had recommended that this arbitrary six-month period be
removed and that the action be permitted to be brought by or against the
office rather than the officers.' The Montana Rule adopts these proposals.
Thus, these provisions of the Federal Rule which were in the nature of
statutes of limitations are not present in the Montana Rule.
Substitution of parties under Rule 25 is not the same thing as an
amendment under Rule 15 bringing in new parties. Rule 25 covers only
those cases where proper parties were joined originally, and the substituted
parties occupy the same relative position as the original parties in the
cause of action or claim. On the other hand, upon amendment under Rule
15, the cause of action or claim, so far as the new parties are concerned,
may be a new one.'
'4 MOORE 25.03, 25.04 (1950).
R.O.M. 1947, § 93-2809.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2810.
'"PRossER, ToRTs § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
=Clearly the Rule overlaps section 93-2824 to some extent, but the inclusion of sec-
tion 93-2824 in the "List of Statutes Superseded by Rules" (and its resultant re-
peal) is unfortunate. The wrongful death and survivorship statutes of the state
are more unsatisfactory now than they were before the enactment of the Rules, and
the 1963 Legislature should consider remedial legislation.
=A 1961 Amendment to Federal Rule 25(d) provides for automatic substitution in
actions involving public officers.
'84 MOORE 25.02 (1950).
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VI. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
Some twenty years ago the pre-trial conference was transplanted into
Montana practice.' Some members of the Montana Bar regarded it as an
"exotic plant from another soil" which could not grow in Montana.' It
did not prosper, and lived only ten years.' However, it was given an
overdose of nitrogen, in the form of a district court order making pre-trial
conferences compulsory for all civil cases involving an issue of fact triable
before a jury, even when the conference might be of no avail.'
The pre-trial conference has flourished in federal courts and has spread
to approximately two-thirds of the states.' But the deposition and dis-
covery devices afforded by the Rules are necessary to make pre-trial affec-
tive. As Judge Murrah stated in Lynch v. Call:'
The salutary, indeed the desirable and efficacious, purpose of
a pre-trial conference is to sift the discovered and discoverable
facts to determine the triable issues, both factual and legal, and to
chart the course of the lawsuit accordingly. If, as is often the case,
no disputed facts survive the pre-trial discovery and conferences,
a summary judgment is timely and appropriate.
If the pre-trial conference is to be successful, counsel must be acquainted
with the true facts of the case and must be in a position to cooperate with
the court in sifting the facts. Pleadings alone are not a sufficient source
of information; and it is not surprising that the pre-trial conference was not
successful in Montana under a code system which provided no means for
compelling disclosure and discovery by interrogatories and requests to pro-
duce and admit. '
The pre-trial conference is an integral part of the system of procedure
prescribed by the Rules, a prime purpose of which is to expedite the trial
of cases on their merits, thereby avoiding unnecessary delays and expense.
Pleadings can be simplified because the real issues can be defined at the
pre-trial conference, and freedom of joinder of causes and parties "is made
workable by the availability of a pre-trial conference at which the court
can decide the form and order of trial.' '"
From what has been said, it should be clear that a pre-trial conference
will be most successful when it is brought into play shortly before trial '
in cases where the issues may be simplified, proof facilitated, preliminary
matters disposed of, or trial otherwise expedited.
Under Rule 16 it is within the discretion of the court whether a pre-
trial conference should be held. The court may establish by its own rule
a pre-trial calendar and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or
'Laws of Mont. 1939, ch. 61.
3State ex rel. Kennedy v. District Court, 121 Mont. 320,,334, 194 P.2d 256 (1948).
mThe pre-trial act was repealed by Laws of Mont. 1949, ch. 84.
'O'State ex rel. Kennedy v. District Court, 121 Mont. 320, 194 P.2d 256 (1948) ; State
ex rel. Carlin v. District Court, 118 Mont. 127, 164 P.2d 155 (1945).
2According to the Report of the Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure to the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Sept. 9, 1955, there were at that time 41 jurisdic-
tions which authorized pre-trial conference.
2261 F.2d 130, 132 (10th Cir. 1958).
')Supra note 290.
11A BAx ON AND HOLTZOFp § 471, at 832-33 (1960).
'See 3 MooRs 16.08, at 1110 (1948).
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to non-jury actions or extend it to all actions. The court's rule may pro-
vide that cases be put on the pre-trial calendar automatically or upon mo-
tion of a party. If a motion for a pre-trial conference is required, it should
comply with Rule 7 (b) (1) and state the grounds. Iowever, it has been
said that a pre-trial calendar is probably of greatest utility in centers where
calendars are congested,' and perhaps generally in Montana it would be
preferable for the court to call pre-trial conferences, on its own initiative
or on request of a party in particular cases, by notice to the attorneys to
appear before the court prepared to assist and cooperate with the court in
its efforts to simplify and shorten the actual trial of the case.'
Rule 16 lists five specific matters for consideration at a pre-trial con-
ference, as follows: (1) "The simplification of the issues." If the real
issues are isolated and defined, the necessity for preparation on non-existent
issues is eliminated and the danger of surprise during the course of the
trial will be avoided.' (2) "The necessity or desirability of amendment
to the pleadings." This avoids delays resulting from requests to amend
after the case goes to trial. (3) "The possibility of obtaining admissions
of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof." The parties
may be willing to waive formal proof of documents, they may agree that
technical rules of evidence shall not apply to certain evidence or exhibits,
or they may enter into appropriate stipulations. (4) "The limitation of
the number of expert witnesses." (5) "The advisability of a preliminary
reference of issues to a master for findings to be used as evidence when the
trial is to be by jury." This should be read in connection with Rule 53(b),
however, which provides that reference to a master shall be the exception
and not the rule; that in actions to be tried by a jury a reference shall be
made only when the issues are complicated; and that in actions to be tried
without a jury, save in matters of account, a reference shall be made only
upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it. The five
specific matters to be considered are followed by a sort of residual clause
permitting consideration of "such other matters as may aid in the dis-
position of the action." Under this latter the court may consider and rule
upon questions of jurisdiction, the right to jury trial, the order of trial,
interlocutory motions, and other questions of law. The procedure has re-
sulted in the settlement of many cases, but this is not stated in the Rule
as a matter for consideration at the conference and is really merely a by-
product.
At the end of the conference, the court should make an order reciting
the action taken at the hearing. Of course, counsel may prepare drafts
of the order, and may be able to agree on the form of the order. The order
controls the subsequent course of the action, "unless modified at the trial
to prevent manifest injustice." Thus the order enables the parties to pro-
1'3 Moons 16.07, at 1108 (1948).
'8A form of order is contained in 3 MoosE 16.09, at 1112 (1948).
'In Burton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571, 573 (D. Ore. 1941), Judge
MeColloch said that "it must be made clear that surprise, both as a weapon of
attack and defense, is not to be tolerated under the new Federal procedure." The
same position should obtain under the Montana Rules which are patterned after
the Federal Rules.
'Although Rule 16 provides that the court shall make an order, not all federal
judges make it a regular practice to do so. 3 Moona 16.18 n.1, at 1124 (1948).
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ceed at the trial with the assurance that the matters covered by the order
have been determined.
VII. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY
With the adoption of the new Rules, Montana for the first time will
have a comprehensive system for obtaining and requiring disclosure of in-
formation needed to prepare for and to prevent surprise at trial. As every
lawyer knows, disputes over pleadings seldom result in obtaining a dis-
closure of the case which will be relied upon by the pleader. Equitable
discovery was not a means by which one could discover facts of his op-
ponent's case and thus protect himself from surprise at the trial,' and
has not been utilized in Montana. A bill of particulars at best is "an in-
adequate method of discovery, since it does not seek directly the parties'
c.wn stories, but attacks only the formal allegations of their lawyers." '
The Montana code has provided a system of taking depositions,' and for
inspection of documents relating to the merits of the action or defense. '
But the Rules afford more liberal devices to ascertain facts before trial for
use at trial, to get clues that may be used to obtain evidence, and to dis-
cover what proof an adversary will use in support of his case. They pro-
ide for (1) deposition on oral examination or written interrogatories
(2) interrogatories submitted to parties and answered ex parte under oath,
(3) the production of documents or things for inspection, copying, or
photographing, (4) mental and physical examination, and (5) demand for
the admission of facts or the genuineness of documents.
A. DEPOSITIONS
Rule 26 provides for depositions. Any party may take the deposition
of any person, whether or not the deponent is a party. Leave of court
is required only where the plaintiff serves his notice of taking of the de-
position within 20 days after the commencement of the action and service
of process on the defendant.' This changes the requirement of the Federal
Rule that leave of court need be obtained only when the plaintiff serves his
notice within 20 days after the commencement of the action, which under
Rule 3 is done by filing the complaint. The purpose of the requirement
of leave of court within the twenty-day period is to protect the defendant
and permit him time within which to obtain counsel and inform himself of
the nature of the suit,' and an explanation of the change from the Federal
Rule is found in the greater danger of delay in service after the com-
mencement of the action under the Montana Rule.'
Attendance of witnesses may be compelled by use of a subpoena, as
provided in Rule 45. The examination may relate to "the existence, deserip-
nl POmEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 201 (5th ed. 1941).
'CLARK 341-42.
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1801-1 to -16.
-'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-8301. The code also has provided a system for the perpetuation
of testimony (R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2301-1 to -7), but it has not been a discovery device.
State ex rel. Pitcher v. District Court, 114 Mont. 128, 142, 133 P.2d 350 (1943).
'Rule 26(a).
'Federal Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(a). Of course, the plaintiff needs
no such protection.
"This results from the fact that under the Montana Rule process may be issued to
an attorney and served by any person over the age of 21 (Rule 4C(1) and D(1)) ;
whereas under the Federal Rule process is only issued to and served by the marshall
or person especially appointed by the court (Rule 4(a) and (c)).
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tion, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts." It may include "any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."'
It does not matter whether the facts are exclusively or peculiarly within
the knowledge or control of the adverse party, or whether the facts relate
to the cause of the party taking the deposition or to the case of his ad-
versary."
Rules as to the admissibility of evidence, including those relating to
competency, do not govern. Subdivision (b) of Rule 26 expressly pro-
vides: "It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inad-
missible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." As the Supreme Court
of the United States said in Hickman v. Taylor, "No longer can the time-
honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquir-
ing into the facts underlying his opponent's case."'
There has been much litigation relating to the extent to which dis-
covery may be had of the product of preparation by an adverse party for
trial, such as statements of witnesses at an accident scene and memoranda
of interviews.' The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, did much to settle questions presented but
left some questions unanswered.' In that case, the court held that dis-
covery could not be had of statements of witnesses to and memoranda taken
by an adversary's attorney. The basis for the decision was not that the
attorney-client privilege protected the matter involved. Rather it was that
the plaintiff had made no showing of necessity for the discovery. The
court said:
"Here is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justifica-
tion, to secure written statements, private memoranda and personal recollec-
tions prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his
legal duties. As such, it falls outside the area of discovery and controvenes
the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal
claims. Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwar-
ranted inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attorney.""'
And again: "But the general policy against invading the privacy of an
attorney's course of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to
an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests
on the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to
justify production through a subpoena or court order."'
'Rule 26 (b).
"Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Mass. 1938), being an early but
leading case under the Federal Rules; Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REv. 205, 207 (1942).
80329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Cf. State ex rel. Pitcher v. District Court, 114 Mont. 128,
133 P.2d 350 (1942).
8"For an extended discussion of the problems see 4 MooRE § 26.25 (1950).
8"In the Hickman case, the plaintiff purported to proceed under Rule 33 dealing with
interrogatories, rather than by deposition under Rule 26, but the court did not re-
gard this procedural informality as decisive. The question presented Is equally
present with respect to depositions, interrogatories, and motions for production of
documents.
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The question arises whether the Hickman decision applies to state-
ments of witnesses to a defendant's claim agent or reports of an accident
made by a defendant's employees. No policy against invading the privacy
of an attorney's files without good reason is present in such cases, and, al-
though the cases are not in complete accord, the view has been taken that
even if good cause is required, in the normal case the bare fact of inequality
of the parties with respect to gathering statements of witnesses should suf-
fice to permit discovery.'
A related question, as to which there also has been conflict, concerns
reports prepared by experts hired by the adverse party. In view of the
Hickman case, it is difficult to contend that such reports are "privileged,"
and in Hickman the court ignored an argument of unjust enrichment. Per-
haps the proper solution is the exercise of judicial discretion, as stated
by Professor Moore, as follows:
The court should not ordinarily permit one party to examine
an expert engaged by the adverse party, or to inspect reports pre-
pared by such expert, in the absence of a showing that the facts
or the information sought are necessary for the moving party's
preparation for trial and cannot be obtained by the moving party's
independent investigation or research. However, since one of the
purposes of the Federal Rules as stated in Rule 1 is to facilitate the
inexpensive determination of causes, the court should have the
discretion to order discovery upon condition that the moving party
pay a reasonable portion of the fees of the expert.'
Protection from abuse of the liberal provisions for depositions is af-
forded by Rules 30 and 31. Subdivision (b) of Rule 30, relating to de-
positions on oral examination, provides, inter alia, that the court may make
any order "which justice requires to protect the party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression"; and subdivision (d) of Rule
31, relating to depositions upon written interrogatories, provides that the
court may make "any order specified in Rule 30 which is appropriate and
just."
What has been said relates to the use of depositions for the purpose
of discovery. They also may be used in the action as evidence against any
party who was present or represented at the taking of the depositions, or
who had due notice thereof, provided they are admissible under rules of
law, which would be applicable if the witnesses were present and testifying
at the trial. Subdivision (d) of Rule 26 prescribes the circumstances under
and the extent to which they may be so used. The deposition of a witness
who is not a party to the action may be used as evidence if there are excep-
tional circumstances which make it desirable to do so. Specifically included
in these exceptional circumstances is the fact that the witness is dead, more
than 100 miles from the place of trial or out of the state, unable to attend
because of age, sickness, infirmity or imprisonment, or cannot be procured
by subpoena.' If the deponent is a party to the action, or a person who,
at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director or managing
agent of a corporation, partnership, or association which is a party, the de-
w4 MooRE 26.23, at 1114 (1950).
14 MooRE 26.24, at 1158 (1950).
m Rule 26(d) (3).
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position may be used as evidence although there are no unusual circum-
stances.' Also, any deposition may be used for the purpose of contradict-
ing or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness.m
B. INTERROGATORIES
Rule 33 provides for written interrogatories to be answered in writing
and under oath. They differ from depositions in that (1) leave of court is
not required for their service, and (2) they may be served only upon an
adverse party, and not upon witnesses in general. Further, the party must
have been served with process or have appeared, and 20 days is allowed
for service of answers or objections to the interrogatories. This changes
the provisions of the Federal Rule, which permits service of interrogatories
any time after commencement of the action, requires leave of court if service
is made by plaintiff within 10 days after commencement of the action, and
allows 15 days for service of answers and 10 days for service of objections
to interrogatories. But the provisions of Montana Rule 33 mesh with the
provisions of Montana Rule 26, and accord with the ordinary 20-day period
for service of pleadings.
If interrogatories are directed to a corporation or partnership or as-
sociation, the answers may be made by any officer or agent, who shall
furnish such information as is available to the party. It is immaterial that
the officer or agent is not competent to testify personally as to the mat-
ters.' However, the term "agent" is not defined in the Rule and its
exact scope is in some doubt. In Waider v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,'
the court held that an engineer, fireman, and watchman of a railroad were
not "agents" within the Rule, saying:
The better definition as applicable to the word "agent" under
Rule 33 would seem to be the one pronounced in Mecham on
Agency, 2d Ed., p. 21: "The characteristic of the agent is that
he is a business representative. His function is to bring about,
modify, affect, accept performance of, or terminate contractual ob-
ligations between his principal and third persons. To the proper
performance of his functions, therefore, it is absolutely essential
that there shall be third persons in contemplation between whom
and the principal legal obligations are to be thus created, modified
or otherwise affected by the acts of the agent."
Interrogatories are a less expensive method of discovery than the tak-
ing of depositions, although, of course, the lack of oral examination makes
them less efficacious than depositions. Interrogatories may relate to any
matter which can be inquired into by depositions under Rule 26(b), and
may be used to the same extent as provided in Rule 26(d) for the use of
the depositions of a party.' Further, interrogatories are a cumulative
mRule 26(d) (2).
mRule 26(d) (1).
' 4 MOORE 33.01, at 2254, and 33.97, at 2277 (1950).
t10 F.R.D. 263 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
mrhe provision of Rule 26(d) that a deposition may be used against any party "who
was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice
thereof" is not entirely relevant to interrogatories, since Rule 33 contains no pro-
vision for cross-examination or for participation by anyone other than the pro-
pounding party and the one to whom the interrogatories are addressed. It would
seem that answers to interrogatories would not ordinarily be admissible against
anyone but the answering party. 4 MOORE 33.29, at 2342 (1950).
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method of discovery; they are not merely an alternative to depositions.
They may be served after depositions have been taken, or depositions may be
taken after interrogatories are answered.'m The court may make such pro-
tective order as justice requires, but the burden is on the deponent or party
interrogated to show that the interrogatories should not be allowed.
A number of cases have held that interrogatories calling for opinions,
conclusions, and contentions are improper, reasoning that the object is the
ascertainment of facts. But there is nothing in the Rule which so limits
interrogatories, and the correct inquiry would seem to be whether they
serve a substantial purpose in narrowing issues or leading to evidence and
whether they unduly burden the interrogated party.'
C. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND TANGIBLE THINGS
Rule 34 provides a direct and simple method of discovery by permitting
a party to require the production of documents and tangible things' for
inspection, copying or photographing.' The scope of discovery thus per-
mitted is as broad as the scope of the inquiry permitted by depositions
under Rule 26(b) and by interrogatories pursuant to Rule 3 3 .' However,
the provisions for production are narrower than the provisions of Rules
26 and 33, in that (1) production can be had only by order of court for
"good cause" shown,' and (2) the document or thing to be produced must
be designated. Also, the motion to produce must be made in a pending
action,' and the procedure can be invoked only against a party to the action
and only to compel the production of documents in existence and in the
party's possession, custody or control.'
The requirement that the documents or things be designated has re-
sulted in some disagreement. The Rule refers to "designated" documents
and things; Official Form 20 contemplates that the items be listed and
described in the motion for production.' One view is that the designation
must be sufficiently precise to enable the defendant to go to his files, and
without difficulty, pick out the items requested.' Another view is that it
'
mThe express provision permitting this was added by a 1946 amendment to the Fed-
eral Rule. Before the amendment there was authority limiting the cumulative use
of depositions and interrogatories, especially the use of interrogatories following
depositions. 4 Mools 33.09 (1950).
14 MooRE 33.17, at 2311 (1950).
2rThe Rule in comprehensive terms refers to "documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things."
'
t Rule 34(2), which is to be distinguished, deals with entry upon land or other prop-
erty.87'Originally Federal Rule 34 provided only for the production of documents "which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action." But
by a 1946 amendment the Rule was correlated to the broader language of Rule
26(b) : "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the ex-
amining party or to the claim or defense of any other party."
tmWhat is "good cause" involves a consideration of practical convenience and depends
upon the facts of the particular case. Elements are suggested in 4 MooRE 34.08
(1950).
t2A similar procedure, however, is available under Rule 27 to perpetuate testimony
before any action is brought or while an appeal is pending.
"The procedure cannot be used to require preparation of a document or model for
use by the adverse party. 4 MooRE 34.05, at 2435 (1950).
'The motion should conform to Rule 7(b), and Official Form 20 contemplates that
the motion be supported by an affidavit showing that the party has possession or
custody and that the items are relevant.
mUnited States v. American Optical Co., 2 F.R.D. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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is sufficient if the documents or things are designated by categories, so
long as the categories themselves are defined.' The latter view has been
approved by the Federal Advisory Committee.' The question would seem
to be whether a reasonable man would know what documents or things are
called for.'
If a party does not have sufficient information to permit him to invoke
Rule 34, he may take a deposition under Rule 26 or submit written inter-
rogatories under Rule 33. On the basis of information thus obtained, he
then may be able to move for production under Rule 34.'
Discovery under Rule 34 is "subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b),"
which authorizes the court to frame its order so as to protect the party
from "annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression." In addition, Rule 34
provides that the order " shall specify the time, place, and manner of making
the inspection and taking the copies and photographs and may prescribe
such terms and conditions as are just."
D. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATIONS
Under Rule 35 it is no longer necessary to rely upon stipulations to
permit physical and mental examinations. The Rule provides that in actions
in which the physical or mental condition of a party is in controversy, the
court may order examination. Such order is made only on motion for good
cause shown and is in the discretion of the court.' The person examined
is entitled, if he requests it, to the detailed report of the examining phy-
sician. After such request and delivery to the person examined of the re-
port of the examining physician, the party causing the examination to be
made is entitled upon request to receive from the person examined a like
report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same
mental or physical condition. If a physician fails or refuses to make a
report when ordered to do so he is in contempt of court.*"
E. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Under Rule 36 after an action has been commenced and a party has
been served with process or has appeared,' he may be served with a writ-
ten request for the admission of the genuineness of any relevant document,
or the truth of any relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. T1he
document must be described in and exhibited with the request; and a
copy must be served with the request, unless a copy has already been fur-
nished. The party to whom the request is directed may respond by sworn
mLeven v. Birrell, 13 F.R.D. 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
'Note to 1946 amendments of Rule 34.
m4 MooRE 34.07, at 2448 (1950).
84 MooRE 34.05, at 2437 (1950). By means of a subpoena duce8 tecum any person,
whether or not a party, may be directed to produce a document at the taking of
his deposition. Rule 45 deals with production of "books, papers, documents, or
tangible things" in the possession or under the control of a party or third person.
'Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 997 (1953).
mRule 35(b) (1). This is a change from the Federal Rule which provides that If
the physician refuses to make such a report the court may exclude it from trial.
However, Rule 37(b) (2) (ii) provides that a party who refuses to submit to a
physical or mental examination may be prohibited from Introducing evidence of
physical or mental condition.
This changes the Federal Rule, which provides for requests for admission after
the commencement of the action, which would be when the complaint Is filed, and
which requires leave of court if the plaintiff desires to serve a request within 10
days after commencement of the action.
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statement either specifically denying the matters in question or setting forth
in detail the reasons why he cannot either admit or deny the matters; or
he may test the propriety of the request by written objection that some of
or all the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or that the re-
quest is otherwise improper, in which event he must give notice of a hear-
ing on his objections at the earliest practicable time. The burden is on
the person to whom the request is directed to act not less than 20 days'
after service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the
court may allow on motion and notice. If he fails to do so the matters
stated in the request are deemed admitted.
Requests for admissions are especially effective in obtaining admissions
of facts not really in dispute, thus narrowing the issues. But they are not
the most potent means of discovery because the only penalty for improper
denial is payment of expenses incurred by the party serving the request
in making proof necessitated by the denial. '  Other means of discovery
are enforceable by more drastic sanctions, such as punishment for contempt,
provision that certain facts shall be deemed established, an order preclud-
ing the introduction of evidence, striking out a pleading, dismissing the
action or entering a default judgment, and arrest of a disobedient party.'
VIII. TRIALS AND JUDGMENT
No attempt will be made to review in detail the Rules dealing with
Trials and Judgment or those Rules which follow these topics. However, a
few matters to which reference has not been previously made are particular-
ly deserving of brief attention.
A. JuRY TRIAL
Rule 38 prescribes the steps to be taken to assure the right of jury
trial, although it does not enlarge or diminish the right itself.' Under code
practice jury trial is only waived by failing to appear at the trial, by writ-
ten consent filed with the clerk, or by oral consent in open court entered
in the minutes." Rule 38 changes this. A party must demand jury trial
by filing and serving a written demand upon the other parties not later
than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to the issue to
which the demand relates. " ' No particular form of demand is required,
and the demand may be incorporated into a pleading. Rule 38(c) recog-
nizes that a general demand for jury trial is sufficient, since it provides that
where demandant does not specify the issues "he shall be deemed to have
demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable." But, where a case
8'°This extends the 10 day provision of the Federal Rule.
'Rule 37(c).
'Rule 37(b) and (d).
85 Mooan 38.07 (1951).
8 R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5301.8 "The Montana Constitution, art. III, § 23, provides that, "The right of trial by jury
shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate, but in all civil cases ... upon default
of appearance, or by eonsent of the parties expressed in such manner as the law
may prescribe, a trial by jury may be waived .... This commands that a jury
trial if waived shall be waived in a- certain manner, and it prohibits jury trial
being waived in any other manner. Chessman v. Hale, 31 Mont. 577, 79 Pac. 254
(1905). However, it seems that it is competent for the legislature to prescribe that
consent may be expressed by failure to demand. See, for instance, Glogau v. Hagan,
107 Cal. App. 2d 313, 237 P.2d 329, 332 (1951), for a case in a state having a con-
stitutional provision similar to that of Montana.
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presents both jury and non-jury issues," it may be advisable to specify
particular issues and thus avoid a motion under Rule 39(a) (2) to strike
non-jury issues from the jury calendar and transfer them to the court
calendar." ' If a demandant does specify certain issues, the other party
may, within 10 days after service of the demand or such lesser time as the
court may order, serve a demand for trial by jury of other issues. Once
a demand is made, it cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the par-
ties.'
A party who fails to file and serve a demand within the time specified
waives his right to jury trial even though the failure is inadvertent or un-
intentional."9 Relief from such waiver may, however, be obtained under
Rule 39 (b), which provides that the court upon motion or of its own initia-
tive may, on 10 days notice to the parties, order a trial by jury of any or all
issues for which jury trial could properly have been demanded. This goes
further than the Federal Rule, which does not give the court the right on
its own initiative to order a jury trial where the right has been waived.'
Confusion and diversity of views have developed under the Federal
Rule as to whether an amendment of a pleading revives the right of trial
by jury once waived. The Federal Advisory Committee pointed this out
in its May 1954, preliminary draft and proposed an amendment to Rule
38(d) to provide, "A waiver of trial by jury is not revoked by an amend-
ment of a pleading asserting only a claim or defense arising out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth
in the original pleading."' The Montana Rule incorporates this proposal.
It is evident from the Federal Committee's Note that this provision
was intended to apply where the pleader changes from "equity" to
"law,"' and that it was not intended that it should apply only where the
pleader amends a pleading in an action at law. without changing the legal
nature of the issue. Specifically, the Committee's Note shows an intent
to overrule the Bereslavsky cases.' In these cases it was held that, where
a plaintiff has a substantive choice between equitable and legal relief and
'Of course, cases where this is true are not infrequent under a code system fusing
law and equity, and they may be more frequent under the Rules because of greater
liberality with respect to joinder of claims and counterclaims.
"75 MooRE 38.42, at 331 (1951).
'Rule 38(d). Under Rule 39(a) (1), the parties or their attorneys of record, by
written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court
and entered in the record, may consent to trial by the court.
'"McNabb v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 139 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1943).
m5 MooRE 39.08 (1951).
'-This proposal was not included in the October 1955 Report of the Federal Advisory
Committee.
w2Of course, a problem is presented as to when it may be said that there is such a
change, since in many situations the chancellor in ancient equity could retain a
case for the purpose of granting money damages, which, of course, ordinarily are
granted only at law. 1 PONIFROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 237(e) (5th ed. 1941).
Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945) was a suit for specific per-
formance where the contract was not sufficiently certain in its terms to permit
such a decree but where it was certain enough to constifute a valid contract for
breach of which damages could be recovered. The plaintiff, after previous notice,
amended his complaint to conform to the proof. After stating that the defendant
waived his right of jury trial by failure to demand it, Judge Swan said: "But we
regard this as a case where the chancellor in ancient equity would have awarded
damages if he did not decree specific performance, and hence no jury trial was ever
claimable."
'Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 770;
Bereslavsky v. Kloeb, 162 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816.
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has originally proceeded for equitable relief but subsequently has been
allowed to amend and claim legal relief, he may demand a jury trial on
the legal claim asserted by his amended pleading. ' Consequently, it seems
that under the Montana Rule a plaintiff who starts his suit as one in
equity when he has a choice between equity and law, and a defendant who
interposes an answer in equity when he could answer in law, and does not
demand a jury trial within 10 days after service of the last pleading di-
rected to the issue presented by the original complaint or answer, waives
the right of trial by jury, and the waiver is not revoked by subsequent
amendment from equity to law.'
It may be contended that such a position violates the Montana con-
stitutional requirement of "consent" for waiver.' It would seem that
one does not by inaction waive a right when there is no basis for choice.
However, notice of a potential claim for relief may be said to afford a
basis for choice, and such notice may be said to result from a statement
of the "conduct, transaction or occurrence" in the pleading, regardless of
the relief demanded.' If that theory be accepted, it would seem that the
same result is to be reached regardless of whether it is the party who has
amended his pleading or his adversary that has failed to demand jury
trial.' Each would be considered to have irrevocably waived the right of
trial by jury. Of course, if a party has been misled by his adversary's
pleading, the court may grant relief from his waiver under Rule 39 (b).
The provision of Rule 39(c) with respect to advisory juries has re-
sulted in some conflict. It provides that, "In all actions not triable of
right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any
issue with an advisory jury. . . ." The cases have not been in accord as
to whether this excludes actions in which there was a constitutional or
statutory right of jury trial which has been waived.' Of course, as has been
noted, Montana Rule 39 (b) expressly gives the court the right on its own
initiative to order a jury trial when the right has been waived; but it
would seem that this does not contemplate calling a jury in an advisory
capacity, since it deals with relief from waiver of a right to conclusive trial
by jury. Consequently, it seems that a question still exists as to whether
a court may use an advisory jury in cases where there was a right of trial
by jury which has been waived.
MsProfessor Moore regards these cases as sound. 5 Mooaa 38.41, at 326 (1951)
MooRn (Rules and Official Forms, as amended) 639 (1961).
r'The same problem is presented where the defendant changes his answer from
"equity" to "law" as is presented when the plaintiff changes his complaint from
"equity" to "law." E. H. Tate Company v. Jiffy Enterprises, 16 F.R.D. 571 (E.D.
Pa. 1954).
8MMONT. CONST. art. III, § 23.
The Federal Committee's Note points out that the Rules stress the completely fac-
tual basis upon which the claim for relief rests, and that under Rule 54(c) an
amendment changing the demand for judgment is unnecessary in the cases under
consideration.
'wSee Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Moore v. United States,
196 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1952).
005 MooRE 39.10 (1951) discussing (American) Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co.
of Illinois v. Timms & Howard, Inc., 108 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Hargrove v.
American Central Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225, 228 (10th Cir. 1942).
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B. JURORS
Under Federal Rule 47 the trial judge has the choice of himself examin-
ing prospective jurors on the voir dire, or permitting counsel to do so, or
combining these two methods. The Montana Rule does not follow the Fed-
eral Rule at this point; the Montana Rule follows the practice under the
code and requires the court to permit the parties or their attorneys to con-
duct the examination under the supervision of the court, merely vesting
authority in the court to supplement such examination.
Subdivision (b) of the Montana Rule is new and prescribes an orderly
manner of selecting, examining and challenging jurors, which avoids the
risk of the unknown replacement involved in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. An initial panel of 20 jurors is called, and jurors are con-
tinually substituted for those challenged for cause so as to maintain a panel
of 20 at all times until the voir dire has been completed. Peremptory
challenges are then exercised alternately, the first by the plaintiff and the
second by the defendant, each side having four such challenges. If neces-
sary, additional jurors are called to provide alternate jurors, who are sub-
ject to challenge. When challenges have been completed, the court ex-
cuses sufficient of the last called jurors until a jury of 12 and alternates
remain.
Subdivision (c) of the Montana Rule provides for one or two alternate
jurors, as the court may direct. It follows subdivision (b) of the Federal
Rule, except that it provides for substitution of an alternate juror to take
the place of a juror who becomes incapacitated at any time before the jury
arrives at its verdict, whereas the Federal Rule only provides for such sub-
stitution before the jury retires to consider its verdict.
C. ADVERSE AND HOSTILE WITNESSES
Montana Rule 43 (b) is a mixture of the Federal Rule and the Montana
code provision,' but contains language not found in either with respect to
the nature of examination of a party who has been called as a witness by
the opposite party.
It is a universal rule that a party may interrogate any unwilling or
hostile witness by leading questions, and the Montana Rule, as well as the
Federal Rule so states. However, it is a general rule that impeachment by a
party of his own witness is limited, and this rule has been applied even
though the witness is an adverse party." Rule 43(b), both Montana and
Federal, changes this. A party may call an adverse party and contradict
and impeach him in all respects as though he had been called by the ad-
verse party. Under the Montana Rule, employees and agents of the ad-
verse party, and officers, directors, employees and agents of a corporation
or partnership which is an adverse party, those who are such at the time
they are called and also those who were such at the time of the transaction
out of which the proceeding grew, may be called on the same basis as the
adverse party himself. But the adverse party may also contradict and im-
peach the witness, which gives protection to a party if one of its officers,
agents or employees "has, so to speak, gone over to the enemy."'
"OR.C.M. 1947, § 93-1901-9.
'58 AM. JurL Witnes8es §§ 792 796, 797 (1948).
"25 MooaE 1 43.10. at 1349 (1951).
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Leading questions are expressly permitted by the Federal Rule to be
asked by a party who calls the adverse party, his agents, etc. The Montana
Rule does not expressly provide for such leading questions, but since the
party calling the witness has the "right to examine and cross-examine such
witness the same as if he were called by the opposite party," it would seem
that leading questions may be asked by the party calling the witness. On
the other hand, leading questions ordinarily would seem improper when
the adverse party, his agents, etc., are being examined by the adverse party's
counsel or counsel aligned with the adverse party. This would seem to be
the result of the concluding provision of Montana Rule 43(b), which pro-
vides that the witness "may be examined by the opposite party upon the
subject matter of his examination in chief, but any such examination by
the opposite party shall be under the rules of direct examination unless
the witness is unwilling or hostile with reference to the opposite party, in
which case, the court may, in its discretion, allow the witness to be cross-
examined. "'
D. SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES
Under Rule 49 the use of special verdicts or, in the alternative, general
verdicts accompanied by answers of the jury to interrogatories, is within
the discretion of the court, but the Rule is designed to encourage and facili-
tate their use. ' Under subdivision (a), if the court requires a special ver-
dict and neglects to include an issue of fact raised by the pleading or evi-
dence, a party waives his right to a jury trial on that issue unless he de-
mands its submission before the jury retires. If any issue is omitted with-
out such demand, the court may make a finding with respect to it, and, if
the court omits to make an express finding, one will be deemed made in
accord with the judgment rendered.'
Under subdivision (b), if answers to interrogatories are inconsistent
with the general verdict, the court may direct entry of judgment in ac-
cordance with the answers, or may return the jury for further considera-
tion of its answers and verdict, or may order a new trial.' When the
answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise incon-
sistent with the general verdict, the court may not direct the entry of
judgment but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers
and verdict or may order a new trial.
"This language is substituted for the provision of the Federal Rule that the witness
"may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of his
examination in chief." It has been held that ordinarily leading questions are not
proper even under such language. J. & B. Motors v. Margolis, 75 Ariz. 392, 257
P.2d 588 (1953) ; Annot., Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(b), and similar state
rule, relating to the calling and interrogation of adverse party as witness at trial,
35 A.L.R.2d 756, 758 (1954).
'Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Zane, 160 F.2d 731, 737, Note 7 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Lips-
comb, Special Verdicts Under the Federal Rules, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 185 (1940).
mAt common law the special verdict had to cover all issues of fact raised by the
pleadings or evidence. Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715(1927). This appears to be the law in Montana under the code. See In re Glick's
Estate, 346 P.2d 987, 997 (Mont. 1959) ; Coburn Cattle Co. v. Small, 35 Mont. 288,
293, 88 Pac. 953 (1907).
OwCompare the code rule that when a special finding of facts is inconsistent with the
general verdict, the former controls over the latter. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5202.
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E. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
It has been the settled law in Montana that, when plaintiff and de-
fendant move for a directed verdict, and do nothing more, each thereby
waives trial by jury and the court is constituted the trier of all questions
of law and fact.' Rule 50 changes this. Subdivision (a) provides that,
"A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of
trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed
verdicts." Further, a party who moves for a directed verdict at the close
of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event
that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do
and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.
Subdivision (b) authorizes a trial judge, without expressly reserving
his ruling on a motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the
evidence, to withhold his decision thereon until after the case has been sub-
mitted to the jury. On motion within 10 days after receipt of the verdict
(or, when the jury has been unable to agree, within 10 days after the jury
has been discharged), the court may enter a judgment in accordance with
the previous motion for directed verdict. A motion for judgment n.o.v.
may be entertained only if the movant has made a motion for a directed
verdict at the close of all the evidence.' However, a motion for new trial
may be joined with a motion for judgment n.o.v., or a new trial may be
prayed for in the alternative; and the trial judge is given discretion to
either grant a new trial or enter a judgment in accordance with the previous
motion for directed verdict.'
F. JUDGMENT
The definition of a judgment in subdivision (a) of Montana Rule 54
is a combination of the code definition" and the Federal Rule definition.
The Federal Rule includes within the term judgment "any order from
which an appeal lies.''' The Montana Rule precedes this provision with
the code definition of a judgment as "the final determination of the rights
of the parties." The result is somewhat abstruse. However, it seems that
the Montana Rule does not justify a position that appealable interlocutory
orders are "final judgments." Section 93-8003 of the Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947, which differentiates final judgments from appealable inter-
locutory orders, is not superseded or repealed; and other code provisions
with respect to appeals, which require a distinction between interlocutory
orders and final judgments, remain unchanged."
There has been considerable difficulty in determining what constitutes
a final judgment in cases where there are multiple claims and parties. Sub-
division (b) of Federal Rule 54 was originally adopted in view of the wide
scope and possible content of the civil suit unider the Rules, in order to
'In re Glick's Estate, 346 P.2d 987, 997 (Mont. 1959) ; Granier v. Chagnon, 122 Mont.
327, 334, 203 P.2d 982 (1949).
m5 MOORE 50.08, at 2328 (1951).
'Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 215 (1947).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4701.
m'It is settled that Rule 56, which provides for "summary judgments" in some situa-
tions where what is involved is an interlocutory adjudication, does not enlarge or
restrict the right of appeal. 6 MooRE 54.01, at 5, 54.02, n.4, at 15 and 54.20,
54.21 (1953).
'
2Thus R.C.M. 1947, § 93-8004, prescribing different time limits for taking appeals,
Is not superseded or repealed.
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avoid injustice of delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim to await
adjudication of the entire case. But frequently a party could not be sure
whether an adjudication respecting one of several claims was a judgment
finally disposing of the claim. To avoid loss of rights, if the adjudication
was adverse to him, such a party would appeal without awaiting final dis-
position of the entire case, thus leaving the determination of whether there
was a final judgment for the appellate court. Consequently, subdivision
(b) was amended in 1946, to prohibit an appeal from a separate judgment
unless the trial court certifies that there is no just reason for delay. 8 But
conflict has existed as to whether the subdivision as amended applies to
multiple party actions, where the court dismisses the action as to less than
all the parties suing or being sued."' This led the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee in its 1955 Final Report to propose another amendment, stating
explicity that Rule 54(b) does apply to multiple parties as well as to
multiple claims. The Montana Rule incorporates this proposal. 5 No deter-
mination as to fewer than all of the claims or parties is a final judgment
from which an appeal may be taken, unless the trial court certifies that
there is no just reason for delay; and it is in the discretion of the trial
court whether to make such a certificate." The certificate may be reviewed
by the appellate court only to determine whether there has been an abuse
of discretion in making it.t
The provision of subdivision (c) of Rule 54 with respect to demand
for judgment is similar to the code provision." The first sentence states
the traditional view that a default judgment shall not give any relief dif-
ferent from or in excess of that demanded. The second sentence provides
that in non-default cases the judgment is not limited by the demand, but
"shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled." This implements the fusion of law and equity and Rule 15(b).
It clearly permits the granting of a different kind of relief from that
prayed. Some conflict exists, however, as to whether a claimant may be
awarded money damages in excess of what is demanded in his pleading.'
It has been said that Waldrip v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., holding
that a claimant cannot be awarded damages in excess of those demanded
in the complaint, "cannot be regarded as authoritative."'
tmFederal Advisory Committee Note of 1946 to amended subdivision (b).
m 3 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF § 1193.2 (1958).
"
mIn 1961 after the adoption of the Montana Rules, Federal Rule 54(b) by amend-
ment was expanded to cover multiple parties.
'"Tmhe Rule does not specify the standard or principle to be followed by the trial
court in making its certificate, but under the original Rule the question for the
court was whether the judgment was rendered on a claim not arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence as a claim still to be litigated. Reeves v. Beardall,
316 U.S. 283 (1942). Presumably the trial court in deciding whether to make a
certificate should apply the same standard.
'Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956). The standard to apply
in determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion is not spelled out.
tR.C.M. 1947, § 93-4704.
tm 3 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF § 1194, at 38 (195,S) ; 6 MOORE 54.62, at 1209 (1953). See
also CLARic 270-71.
m11 F.R.D. 426 (D.La. 1951).
'8 3 BARRON AND HOLTZOFp § 1194, at 38-39 (1958).
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G. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Under Montana Rule 59 the grounds for new trial are those "provided
by the statutes of the state." A motion for new trial must be served not
later than 10 days after service of notice of entry of judgment, and when
a motion is based upon affidavits they must be served with the motion.
The opposing party then has 10 days to serve opposing affidavits, which
time may be extended for an additional 20 days either by the court for good
cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation.
Two significant changes from code practice are made by Rule 59, giv-
ing the court control over verdicts and judgments which has not existed
under code practice. First, the court is authorized to grant a new trial on
its own initiative for any reason for which it might have been granted on
motion of a party.' The court must act, however, within 10 days after
entry of judgment and must state the grounds in the order. Second, the
Rule materially expands the authority of the court in acting upon motions
for new trial and adds a provision for a motion to alter or amend a judg-
ment. Subdivision (a) provides that, "On motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may take additional testimony, amend
the findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and con-
clusions, set aside, vacate, modify or confirm any judgment that may have
been entered or direct entry of a new judgment."' Thus, in a non-jury
case the Rule gives great freedom to the court, both as to what it may hear
and the action that it may take. The court is not confined to a considera-
tion of affidavits and minutes of the court, but may open up the case for
the purpose of hearing additional witnesses; and the court may grant re-
lief other and less than a new trial. The court's authority is greater than
in A jury case, although subdivision (e) applies to both jury and non-jury
cases and permits the court, on notice within 10 days after service of entry
of judgment, to alter or amend the judgment.' Of course, this does not
authorize a court, in contravention of the constitutional guarantee of jury
trial, to alter or amend a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in any man-
ner that would constitute a re-examination of the facts found by the jury,
but it goes beyond authority which has existed under code practice.'
"Cf. holdings under code practice: Lish v. Martin. 55 Mont. 582, 585, 179 Pac. 826
(1919) ; State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 55 Mont. 602, 605, 179 Pac. 831 (1919).
'Also Rule 52(b) provides: "Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59."
'According to the Federal Advisory Committee Note of 1946, subdivision (e) was
added to the Federal Rule by amendment to codify such decisions as Boaz v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of New York, 146 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1944). In that case the action
had been dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41 at the close of the plaintiff's
case. On motion of defendant made 2 days thereafter, the district court set aside
the dismissal without prejudice and entered a judgment of dismissal with pre-
judice.
mCf. the situation under code practice: A district court has inherent power to
amend its judgment for the purpose of correcting an error which has crept into it
by misprision of the clerk, judge, or counsel, so that it may speak the truth as to
what was actually decided. Morse v. Morse, 116 Mont. 504, 154 P.2d 982 (1945).
On motion for new trial, a court may remit a portion of a verdict on condition
that unless remission be accepted by the successful party a new trial will be
granted, but such practice is unwarranted where the verdict was influenced by
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IX. CONCLUSION
This article, and the briefing sessions for lawyers and judges which
were held during the months of August and September, 1961, necessarily
have hit only the high spots of the new Montana procedure. The bench and
bar must familiarize themselves with details of the new Rules by study
and application. Inevitably problems will arise in the adjustment of the
new procedure to what remains of the old. The Rules must be integrated
with code provisions to effect a mode of procedure which is a systematic
whole. In their application, it should be borne in mind that the Rules
were promulgated pursuant to an enabling act, stating the purpose and
intent "to make possible the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
(lure so far as seems presently practicable to the existing Montana Code."'
Liberality and elasticity of interpretation should be practiced, to comply
with the admonitions of Rule 1 that the new procedure "shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action,"
and of Rule 61 that "any error or defect in the proceding which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties" must be disregarded. Wisely
used and administered the new Rules will do much to expedite the deter-
mination of controversies on their merits and to eliminate and satisfy com-
plaints about our legal system.
"Laws of Mont. 1959, ch. 255, § 1.
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